Samuel Scheffler on “Immigration and the Significance of Culture”

Thom,
Thank you for your post.
I would argue that the issue whether culture should be a trump argument should be answered in the negative. Some sort of cost internalization should be at work. This means that an argument like ‘my culture makes me do / want X’ should be rejected, as it probably relies on nothing more than less than serious sociology.
I would leave the issue of treating culture as a whole or to look for the values behind it to the individual who makes the cultural claim.
The justification for partial accommodation by the state + some sort of cost internalization should stem from giving cultural requests the same treatment as requests stemming from other interests - no less, but no more (admittedly, some cases are more convenient for cost sharing than others, but that should be the general correct approach as it seems to me). The goal of the policy would be to enable following a less often chosen cultural taste, rather than to allow aggregated preferences to dominate cultural ‘markets’.
If you’re in Belgium on November 30, I’m giving a talk about it in Louvain:
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-25585.html The talk is titled: ‘cultural requests and cost internalization’, and the paper itself is under review at the moment (I hope I’m not trans passing some laws as I write this…).

Thanks for your thoughtful reply, Nahshon.

I think we largely agree, but let me see how deep our agreement is. I take the point that the appeal from culture is not absolute. In other words, it should not be the case that any group may act however it likes solely on the grounds that we should let them out of respect for their culture. Ok.

Where I am less clear is on the interests, as you put it. It strikes me that more than one interest are intertwined in many conceptions of a culture. The fulfillment of my interests as a practicing Catholic or Muslim — I am neither, but only state this as one example — cover both practices (perhaps a way of life) and respect for beliefs. I am not sure that either is reducible to x, y, z whereby we can say to either:

“Ok. We happily respect your cultural interests with respect to x and y, but forget about z.”

I am not sure about this because I suspect that x, y, z form an organic whole. We can’t then pick and choose what we like — nor, far more importantly, does “culture” drop from the equation — as Scheffler appears to suppose.

I am not then in a major disagreement with Scheffler and I do think his piece is worthy of special attention. However, at the same time, I think his views (which I largely agree with) lead him to support a strange position that strikes me as impractical, if not impossible.

P.S. Unfortunately, I’m unable to head to Belgium on the 30th. I confess that instead I’ll be enjoying Allan Holdsworth at the Cluny in Newcastle!

Dear Thom, I can’t compete with Alan Holdsworth, I missed him at the Jazz festival in Montreal (I choose Bela Fleck over him… I confess) - have fun!

As for your comment, believes are fine, as long they do not impose costs on others (disregarding crazy things such as, I’m going to tell people to kill X and so on). Requests from the government are different, and we’ll have to pick and choose, or rather, better let the person making the cultural requests do the picking.
For example, A Muslim who demands: build a mosque in the grand place in Brussels, or a Muslim who asks not to assign him to work on Friday afternoon (the time of collective prayer in Islam). I don’t see why we should have an approach which is either both or nothing.
If cultural demands are no better, or worse, than other demands, the former should be rejected (because the grand place is a world heritage in Brussels, that should not be changed, and because the cost of building there would be so huge, that other needs, needed by the Muslim himself, such as education and so on, would be neglected), while the latter should be accommodated, for example, by assigning him to other shifts (on Sunday perhaps?). Cost matters, context matters and so on - but they do so in other cases too: for example, parental requests (can we speak of a holistic parental needs?) , with holidays, with many other subjects - why should culture be different?

Thom-It sounds to me like Scheffler’s got this right (but I haven’t read the article). You may be interested in looking at Tyler Cowen’s work on the topic.

In a brief response to Andrew, I do largely think Scheffler has this right. What I found striking is the reaction of my colleagues who work in the area of multiculturalism, both largely disappointed by his work. My suggestion — as an American in a UK department — that the piece is perhaps an intelligent and nuanced expression of an American perspective on culture seemed to resonate with them. Their suggestion was that his piece seems to want to speak to immigration and its affect on national culture without considering some clear cases where the national culture is affected by immigration…outside North America.

To be fair, this topic represents unchartered territory for me and I do not know the literature well. Beyond my failure to accept the statement by Scheffler cited above, I have been struck since by non-American colleagues that fear that if culture can be treated in the ways Scheffler suggests then his account fails to account for the ways in which culture is significant for those who find their culture of significance. This is not my worry, but a worry of others that seems it might have something to it.

Thanks again for these further terrific reflections, Nahshon. I take your points (and on Fleck, whom I’m also a big fan of).

Perhaps what is troubling me is thinking of cases that trouble no one else. That is, take certain demands by cultural groups. In your post, you state that — for example — if a Muslim has a demand to x (such as working on Fridays), then this has unreasonable costs and the demand should not be respected…at least not on cultural grounds. Maybe this is the view from my homeland across the Atlantic Ocean, but consider a case in the UK now. A major supermarket chain has just agreed a polic whereby their Muslim employees have a choice when checking out customers at their tills. If a customer is purchasing goods that Muslims may not purchase, some Muslims claimed they ought not be forced to allow others to purchase these goods as they are forbidden by their religious beliefs. In response, the supermarket said fine: if I want to purchase a six pack of beer at the supermarket and have a Muslim shopping attendant who is happy to scan through all my items save the alcohol, the attendant can do just this…and a second colleague will be called over to scan the item through for me.

Admittedly, I found this decision by the supermarket curious and I’m surprised they agreed to it. Moreover, I have never been in a situation where the cashier refused to allow me to purchase pig products (bacon, pork) or alcohol. For all I know, it hardly happens. This case might strike many as unreasonable. I am not sure whether the supermarket really had even a moral duty to make the decision it did. However, I do think the supermarket was not doing anything bad. In fact, it appears to be making a genuine effort to accommodate a perceived cultural interest expressed by a group. It strikes me as quite generous and sensitive. Moreover, surely the supermarket agreed this with a view to the decision not harming profits, if not increasing them.

This sensitivity to cultural difference seems absent in Scheffler’s account. I’m not sure it is a problem for the account, etc. But reasonableness is in the eye of the beholder. In a different land, following different ways of life, what might seem unreasonable one place may seem quite reasonable (or at least not unreasonable) elsewhere.

Dear Thom,
the example of the supermarket is interesting. I would say, that the accommodation offered there is fine, at least as there are enough staff members who would enable the selling of products forbidden by Muslims. Perhaps I was not clear, I did not say that cultural accommodation is wrong, I do think that cultural accommodation beyond any other accommodation (offered in other spheres of behavior) is wrong.
The issue with the supermarket has some interesting parallel lines with other cases: Rajeev Bhargava told me of a case that involved cows and the public sphere in India, in which Hindu leaders requested from the Muslim minority to avoid eating cows’ meat all together (I hope I remember this correctly…).
The argument that some Hindus, or supporters of cultural claims might see this as a good thing if the government in India enforces such a a ban, has to be problematic for liberals, if the result is cultural domination of one group in the public sphere, and thus the liberty deprivation for minority groups is drastic - (what if one’s culture would oppose education for women, or simply include too much spheres of behaviour?)
It seems to me that the argument ‘it is important for my culture’ is only the beginning of an argument rather than its end.

Thanks again, Nahshon. Indeed, there must be additional staff on hand to help, when/if necessary.

I am not sure there is much, if any, space between our positions in the end and I’ve benefitted from your points a lot. I certainly agree that claims from culture are a beginning, not an end, of the argument.

I suppose what strikes me is that dropping culture — as Scheffler recommends — in favour of value-talk seems to be a mistake because more than two or more values may be inseparably connected with any claim. Thus, we can’t speak of each value separate to others. What explains the connection between a given set of inseparable values may be its cultural connection. Thinking about the values inherent in culture is surely wise, but not the only object of our concern. These values don’t simply have importance on their own — otherwise we might not have had a culture that combines these values (with others) in unique ways, ways which given meaning to many.

Dear Thom,
I like the idea of culture as ’super glue’. It can be developed to all kinds of directions. For example, of concentring circles, that is, the norms that are closer to the middle as the most important ones. For example, the Jewish ultra Orthodox community in Jerusalem had a norm of not working and relying on governmental welfare. However, due to significant cutbacks in welfare policies in Israel, they changed this norms, and now many men go to work (the women worked anyhow). I doubt however, if other norms, such as not eating pork for example are ‘changeable’ in a similar fashion. So the pork is closer to the middle than the attitude towards labour.

Another issue: why is it important to hold our values and norms together? What is wrong with an eclectic approach? Probably some sort of psychological stability?

But I would ask whether, from the state’s point of view, is the glue view important? I mean, for allocation policies and so on. I would say that it does not.
Suppose you have two demands for resources, one with the glue view the second without it. Would you give some priority to X asking for y if he says ‘this request is important for me because it is connected to other values and norms’, than to another guy, having a similar request that has no connection to other norms?
Why the different treatment?
Perhaps we have a technical issue here, for example, in the U.S. Yoder case, one of the judges approved of the request of the Amish, because he recognized them as a well known and old religious sect. This is reasonable, but a bit conservative no?
Perhaps a policy of no to all cultural requests, or a ‘pool’ of resources to be allocated to all equally is a better view?

I’m coming to this a little late, but will pipe in, anyhow.

I’m a little unclear as to why the position in question can’t accommodate the objection that sometimes multiple values come ‘glued together’ as it were? The claim made by Scheffler as reported above seems to be that we shouldn’t endorse/accept normative demands simply on the basis of their being ‘cultural’, but we should rather evaluate such demands in light of the ‘values, principles, and ideals’ they express and rely on.

What then is the problem with trying to redescribe a ‘cultural demand’ in terms of an underlying ‘value’ (principle or ideal) or underlying ’set of values’ which cannot be untied from one another? I see nothing in Scheffler’s position which blocks us from considering values as tied together with one another. Some values come in sets for some people. Is there anything in Scheffler’s position which requires us to analytically decompose claims into the simplest atomic units?

A further consideration. Perhaps when faced with certain ’sets of values’ as underlying certain claims, we might want to insist that some of the values underlying the claim are legitimate and others are not. We evaluators might want to untie the values from one another, but if from the point of view of the claimant they cannot be untied, then we have to deal with what we have. We are forced, by the claimant, to evaluate the whole ‘value set’ as it were. We can always, of course, try to coax them into seeing how some of their values are detachable from other of their values. But they might not come to see things this way (nor might we if we happen to find pairs of values intrinsically connected.) Now, the concept of ‘culture’ if it has a role to play here might still be useful as part of an explanatory account of how certain values come to be glued together such that they are inseparable for some claimants. (But the thought that ‘culture’ explains anything ought to be run by our colleagues in anthropology, many of whom find themselves bewildered by this word these days.) This explanatory function of culture seems to be part what you have in mind, Thom. I am not sure that this is inconsistent with Scheffler’s argument, though, unless you want to go on to claim that this explanatory usage of culture somehow has normative force built into it. That’s an interesting consideration, but at first blush it strikes me as wrong, or at least in need of further defense.

Nahshon:

My thanks again for yet another enlightening post: I’ve really benefitted from your comments. This is terrific.

Should we go with the eclectic view or something else? I don’t know. My sense here is that the values of a culture are probably themselves eclectic and arise in the development of that culture over time. I am not suggesting that the values of any cultural are necessarily perfectly consistent with one another: often any pairing of values will conflict. Nevertheless, I do think a culture is what it is in part due to the values that underpin it. Unlike Scheffler, I do not think we should speak of “values” rather than “culture” because cultural values are not fully independent and separable from each other. This is *not* to say that a culture is not longer recognizable (or falls apart) if we downgrade a value or practice — sati comes to mind — and, in fact, a good strategy here is to demonstrate how this practice conflicts with the main tenets of Hindu ethics broadly construed. My worry with Scheffler is that he seems to think we can drop “culture” and pick and choose certain values depending upon whether or not they we like them. But culture doesn’t work like that. Cultural values come as a package — we might change the wrapping or put a new bow on top, but when we put something different in the box (or remove it altogether) we’re talking about something else…

Colin:

Many thanks for your helpful post. You pick up on several excellent points. Yes, I agree that “culture” might offer little more than an explanation of why a certain set of values has the importance it does for a particular group. What is more, some (of all!) of these values may well be unacceptable to a community. I surely recognize that no cultural group may have the right to do what it might like because of some appeal to cultural ways of life. A state may have an interest in accepting some beliefs/practices and not others. I don’t deny this.

My worry then is that Scheffler’s view takes cultures in an odd way that those who take their culture seriously might not accept. We don’t strap cultures on an operating table and perform ethical surgery, and then offer this product to a group as their culture.

What is gained in Scheffler’s procedure? Perhaps we might think that we can clear away some bad arguments and consider views on their merits, weighing only the values of values. The problem is that this “gain” comes at the expense of any theory of why certain values hold they value that they do within their cultural context.

Thus, I don’t disagree with Scheffler’s view as a political way forward…of sorts. My worry instead is that his treatment of culture a collection of atomistic values that can be carved up fails to appreciate why values make up a culture.