Comments on: Estlund Reading Group Chapter 3

By: David Estlund

David Estlund — Sun, 03 Feb 2008 19:44:16 +0000

As you’ll see on the main page, I’ve posted some thoughts on this week’s comments up to this point.

By: Andrew Lister

Andrew Lister — Fri, 01 Feb 2008 17:04:26 +0000

One more quick question to add on here. If we’re applying the QAR to some domain X, with possible decisions X1 through Xn, and each of these options is subject to qualified objections, do we throw up our hands and say that no decision is justified, and that we are damned no matter what we do (or don’t do)? Or, must one of the Xn be identified as the default that obtains when no option passes the QAR? I was assuming that the answer had to be the latter; even if both exercising and not exercising coercive political power over someone are subject to qualified objections, not coercing wins, because it’s the default. But perhaps the first approach is conceivable, and David’s comment on 60-61 about a situation in which political justification was impossible brought it to mind.

By: Ben Saunders

Ben Saunders — Thu, 31 Jan 2008 09:40:55 +0000

A lot of good questions already, but I’m still slightly puzzled about what’s going on. If I present what I think is an over-simple outline, can anyone tell me what’s wrong with it?

Suppose we can rank possible decision mechanisms according to epistemic value:
1 Strong epistocracy (rule of the wise)
2 Weak epistocracy (extra votes for the wise)
3 Democracy
4 Coin tossing
5 Failed epistocracy (rule of the not wise)

I have in mind those being objectively defined, so we could all agree that rule of the wise is best, but we don’t agree who is wise, so any specific proposal (e.g. extra votes for Catholic priests) could, from qualified points of view, be seen as 5 even if it’s actually 1 or 2.

Is the argument simply that democracy is the best that all (qualified) points of view could accept? That makes some sense of the argument, to me, but I think it may require more argument to show democracy is best out of the acceptable procedures. Also I’m not clear on where other non-democratic options such as anarchy or market-based solutions might fit.

Finally, is the acceptance of democracy, or any other proposal, simply a matter of them crossing an acceptability threshold or shouldn’t it depend on the available alternatives? I’d have thought if coin tossing was the best possibility (compared to democracy, anarchy or any supposed epistocracy) then it ought therefore to be acceptable.

By: Andrew Lister

Andrew Lister — Wed, 30 Jan 2008 07:09:56 +0000

One further issue: if the QAR must pass QAR, but the QAR involves a default position that consists of the absence of coercive exercise of state power, disagreement among qualified points of view about what is the non-coercive or less-coercive baseline would be a problem. Ordinarily, qualified objections lead us to default to not exercising coercive power, by the QAR. But if there is reasonable disagreement about what it means “not to exercise power”, then there will be objections based on claims about the misapplication of the QAR that leave us without a default. I’m tempted by the “dogmatic” route (p.57).

By: Andrew Lister

Andrew Lister — Wed, 30 Jan 2008 06:54:56 +0000

I’m confused about the recursive application of the QAR (53, and p.57). We start off with the claim that the exercise of political power is legitimate only if justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view. But since the QAR will be an element of the justification of any exercise of power, the QAR itself has to acceptable to all qualifed points of view. That, in itself, is “no defect in the doctrine” (p.54), although certain criteria of qualification will make the principle exclude itself. The theory would be “fatally flawed,” however, if the qualified points of view got to say what count as the qualified points of view (p.53). The solution to this problem is on p.63: one of the criteria of qualification is acceptance of the full theory of qualification. I’m not clear on what the fatal problem is, if it is not self-exclusion, nor how this solution avoids it.

If the QAR applies to itself, at some point we will have to provide a criterion of qualification, and then face the question of whether all points of view so qualified endorse the restriction of the exercise of political power by the QAR (as suggested on p.60). Stipulating that we will consider unqualified all those otherwise qualified points of view that reject the QAR seems question-begging. I see David’s point in the following paragraph, that a view disqualified in this way is not disqualified because the view is judged to be on the whole false. Rather, the view is disqualified because it rejects a particular claim that is crucial to qualification. The examples of such claims on p.61 are that all people are morally free and equal and that even reasonable people can disagree. I don’t have any problem with making acceptance of such claims criterial for qualification. But I thought that the problem was that some points of view that accept that these claims might nonetheless reject the QAR. These otherwise reasonable points of view accept moral freedom and equality and the burdens of judgment, but still assert that the exercise of political power need not pass the QAR. If the QAR applies to itself, how can we justify excluding as unqualified those views that pass all the substantive tests of qualification, except for the test of accepting the QAR itself? (I suppose that Raz’s liberal perfectionism would accept the substantive views necessary for qualification, but reject QAR. Will it then be disqualified?) We have substantive reasons for denying rejection rights over political coercion to views that deny moral freedom and equality, but do we have the same kind of reasons for denying rejection rights to those who accept moral freedom and equality, but not the QAR? (Maybe I’m off track - it is getting late)

By: Bill Edmundson

Bill Edmundson — Wed, 30 Jan 2008 00:27:34 +0000

Richard, I think that if POVx satisfies a specific QAR then that QAR is ipso facto not a useful one for epistemic proceduralism. In other words, such a QAR would not do the winnowing work of ensuring that democracy doesn’t have to be shown to be the epistemically best arrangement of all possible arrangements, but only that it is the best that is generally acceptable.
Leave aside the QAR for a moment. Each POV is either committed to the view that democracy is the epistemically at least as good as any as a way to arrive at collective political wisdom, or it is not. A QAR useful to epistemic proceduralism can’t exclude the latter POVs as such –that would be too quick, even question-begging. So, a useful QAR must be open to qualifying some POVs that are not committed to democracy on epistemic grounds (they may or may not be committed to democracy on other grounds, e.g., fairness). If they are admitted, and it is controversial whether democracy is epistemically the best arrangement, then the announced argumentative strategy for epistemic proceduralism fails. That strategy was to first clear the room of unqualified POVs and then see whose arrangement among the remainder is epistemically best. Those left in the room who hadn’t already been committed to the epistemic superiority of democracy have rejection rights, which they will presumably then exercise. What’s to stop them?
To be of use, the QAR therefore has to exclude those POVs, despite the fact that one of them might be the true one. (Excluded on grounds other than falsity, of course.) POVx says, “I exercise my rejection right to object to their exclusion, unless I’m shown that it is in fact true that democracy is epistemically superior to any other viable arrangement.” Now, there may indeed be such an argument; but if there is it doesn’t follow the announced argument strategy –because if the argument goes this way the QAR isn’t specified until after the epistemic superiority of democracy over all comers (qualified or not) has already been established.

By: Micah Schwartzman

Micah Schwartzman — Wed, 30 Jan 2008 00:11:43 +0000

Richard, I don’t think your suggestion will work, at least not with respect to those views disqualified for rejecting the correct account of qualification. Because of the insularity requirement, such views could not be advanced by qualified counterparts under QAR.

For example, suppose I offer as a public justification the argument above for a compulsory Bible study program. Premise (2) of that argument is incompatible with QAR. It rests on a competing view of the truth about legitimacy. All views qualified under QAR must reject that competing view. Thus, no qualified view could accept my claim that (2) is part of an acceptable justification for a compulsory Bible study program.

With respect to your more general point, I agree that QAR determines the admissibility of doctrines rather than people. But it determines admissibility by asking whether doctrines are acceptable to a certain set of views. And presumably, those views are held by citizens (real or hypothetical), as the formulation of AN (on p. 53) suggests. If some views are disqualified, then the people who hold them have no right to reject claims that conflict with their disqualified views. And, to that extent, they are excluded from the process of determining what counts as legitimate law.

By: Richard Chappell

Richard Chappell — Tue, 29 Jan 2008 22:22:00 +0000

Bill, I was thinking that POVx is both true and accepted (qualified) by the epistemic proceduralist. Could you say a little more about why you expect it to be excluded instead? (It seems to me that you’ve convincingly argued that it shouldn’t be excluded! But it’s not a dilemma unless there’s some reason not to embrace the other horn…)

Micah - I wonder if this helps: even if your POV is disqualified (by virtue of your disbelieving QAR), we can imagine a counterpart of you who endorses QAR along with your substantive views, and so may be qualified in your place. So if you have an objection based on your substantive views, then your counterpart may qualify your objection. That is, the proposal is not justifiable to all (possible) qualified POVs, thanks to your counterpart, and so QAR renders the objectionable proposal illegitimate after all.

The key point here is that QAR (if I’ve interpreted it correctly) does not determine which people may or may not have a say in the political process. Rather, it determines which proposals are objectively legitimate (independently of who is actually proposing or objecting to them).

By: Micah Schwartzman

Micah Schwartzman — Tue, 29 Jan 2008 21:57:12 +0000

David, I’m not sure I follow your response to the worry that QAR makes experts into bosses. If my point of view is disqualified, it can’t serve as a defeater for the legitimacy of state action. It isn’t (or ought not to be) counted in a legitimate decision-making process. But if my view is qualified, which depends in part on my accepting the relevant criteria of qualification (whatever those happen to be), then my views do count. Political claims based on justifications inconsistent with my views are illegitimate. I’m empowered, as it were, to veto proposals that conflict with my view. Since the qualified have moral powers (rights of rejection) that the disqualified do not, they (the qualified) seem to saying: “Because we’re qualified, we have the right to decide what is a legitimate exercise of state power, and you, the disqualified, do not.” That looks like the expert/boss fallacy.

Have I missed something here having to do with the distinction between legitimacy and authority? If so, I may have misunderstood the fallacy, which is stated as the illicit inference from “S would rule better” to “S is a legitimate or authoritative ruler” (p. 41). If the fallacy applies to claims about legitimacy (and not only claims about authority), then I don’t see how QAR avoids it.

Also, without knowing the content of QAR, I’m not sure why those with disqualified views are entitled to political and civil liberties. On some specifications of QAR, couldn’t there be a possible qualified objection to empowering the disqualified?

By: Bill Edmundson

Bill Edmundson — Tue, 29 Jan 2008 21:37:06 +0000

Richard, I meant the second objection to be taken as a challenge, but just before I posted I changed “might –wrongly– have to exclude” to “would –wrongly– have to exclude.” Let me change that back. POVx is still presents a dilemma, I think. Is it to be excluded because false? But falsity per se shouldn’t be disqualifying; moreover POVx doesn’t seem fishy in the way premise (2) of the Christianity example seems fishy. Premise (2) of the Christianity example states that utmost truths should be inculcated by force-backed policies. POVx states that the true POV, whatever it might be, should have the same “rejection rights” as other qualified points of view. And Premise (2) wouldn’t gain admission via POVx, if POVx were accepted.

By: Richard Chappell

Richard Chappell — Tue, 29 Jan 2008 17:37:28 +0000

Bill, I may have misunderstood your second objection, but isn’t it question-begging to assume that QAR would have to exclude your POVx? I agree that it does sound right that “at least the true POV is qualified.” But I think this is consistent with QAR, since presumably any disqualified view is being disqualified precisely because it claims something false about, e.g., the legitimate exercise of political power — cf. premise (2) in the Christianity example.

By: David Estlund

David Estlund — Tue, 29 Jan 2008 17:14:36 +0000

Great summary, and I’m eager to follow the comments again. I will try not to say too much until later in the week, as usual. (Then I WILL say too much.) But quick clarifications might be helpful here and there. Here are two I hope help:

1. Bill, the reason I say that the overexclusion view is committed to the admissibility of all doctrines, is that I am considering the objection as aimed at the schema of QAR. Since the schema doesn’t specify what’s qualified and what’s not, the claim that it’s already exclusionary, no matter how the content of “qualified” is filled in, logically entails a commitment to the admissibility of all views (I believe).

2. Micah and Bill: The QAR does not empower anyone politically, and so there is no danger of its making experts into bosses. It says that some possible objections are morally weightless, others (even some based on false views) are weighty. You don’t have to count as qualified to have all the political and civil liberties, including the rights to vote and hold office, just as on Rawls’s view.

3. As for the “actual acceptability view,” I distinguish sharply between legitimacy and authority. I say in this chapter that I’m leaving open the possibility (but do not commit myself to it, since I actually doubt it) that AAV is correct in the domain of legitimacy, and so blocks almost all claims to the permissibility of coercive enforcement of political commands. Philosophical anarchism (as the term is normally used) is a view about what I call authority, or the obligation to obey the law. In later chapters (as sketched in the overview in Ch. 1) I will argue for a non-voluntarist view of authority, and so, a fortiori, against philosophical anarchism. (It is by no means a thorough treatment of philosophical anarchism, however, something Bill and others have devoted excellent whole books to.)

By: Bill Edmundson

Bill Edmundson — Tue, 29 Jan 2008 16:42:40 +0000

Micah’s summary helped me understand what’s going on in chapter 3, which I think is crucial given the overall structure of the argument. The QAR has got to winnow out any epistemically superior competitors to epistemic proceduralism. My thoughts:
1. Estlund says, “If both the overinclusion and overexclusion objections can be defeated, this would be strong support for the qualified acceptability approach.” (p. 45) I agree that it would be some support, but strong? I agree with Micah that a direct argument for QAR is needed.
2. Estlund writes, “The overexclusion objection…holds that any QAR wrongly excludes some points of view. This evidently means that every point of view should be counted as qualified….The overexclusion objection is committed to a highly inclusive view of which objections have the power to defeat a proposed justification: all of them” (p. 45). Well, that’s not what it evidently means. All the objection needs to do to succeed is to point to at least one POV that would wrongly be excluded by any QAR useful to epistemic proceduralism. The objection does not to have to take the “highly inclusive” form that Estlund goes on to deflect. Let me suggest one POV that an epistemic-proceduralism-friendly QAR would –wrongly– have to exclude. Let this be POVx, which holds that “Any true POV, whatever it may be, meets the QAR.” POVx is of course a view about the QAR. POVx isn’t the “true objection view,” which says that only true POVs are qualified: POVx says rather that that at least the true POV is qualified–which sounds right, doesn’t it? POVx isn’t identical with AAV, because stating the truth about political justice is not merely to object (curmudgeonly or not) to an arrangement. Let me call POVs that aim at truth and employ generally accepted modes of reasoning “expertise-claiming.” Of course, it will be controversial which is the true POV. Therefore, to accept POVx will mean either a) to allow as qualified all expertise-claiming objections, or b) to disqualify all expertise-claiming objections that do not command unanimity within the circle of qualified POVs. Rawls seems to take route b) in Political Liberalism; but I take Estlund to tend rather to option a). The problem with responding to POVx by taking route a) of course is that not all POVs now qualified will rank democracy above truth. Moreover, it is far from certain that democracy rates higher epistemically that all other expertise-claiming POVs (this in fact is the central problem, as Estlund has explained). The QAR will not do the winnowing it needs to do unless it responds to POVx along line b), which in turn draws the objections to Rawls that Micah refers to.
3. I also agree with Micah that the boss/expert fallacy threatens. Moreover, the distinction between epistocracy and democracy begins to blur. Estlund writes: “We do count people as unreasonable [unqualified] for failing to hold certain views, such as, perhaps, that all people are morally free and equal, that even reasonable people can disagree, and so on. Here is one more thing they must accept: a certain view of who counts as reasonable or qualified. We assert its moral significance simply by saying that if you don’t accept this view of who is qualified, then you are not qualified.” (p.61) Hasn’t this “certain view” also got an epistemic significance—namely, that only those who accept this view are equipped to figure out what’s politically best? (Or is it simply a shibboleth, a password?) Maybe comfort can be taken in the fact that epistocracy is the rule of “the few” and “the many” will satisfy the QAR. But that is only contingently so at best.
4. Lastly, to avoid taking on the AAV is to refuse to engage philosophical anarchism, head-on at least. That disappoints me because philosophical anarchism has a number of formidable adherents.