Comments on: Estlund Reading Group Chapter 6 http://publicreason.net/2008/02/18/chapter-vi/ a blog for political philosophers Tue, 06 Jan 2009 21:42:15 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.3.1 By: Ben Saunders http://publicreason.net/2008/02/18/chapter-vi/#comment-468 Ben Saunders Tue, 19 Feb 2008 23:36:53 +0000 http://publicreason.net/2008/02/18/chapter-vi/#comment-468 Some good questions there. I've been trying to push a general worry that the good consequences involved need not be decision outcomes but could be something else, like citizen education. (And David has answered, though I think we may have to disagree). I also think it's fair to say we can't simply identify ideal outcomes independently of how they come about. Democratically-deciding-to-X may be better than doing Y, even though democratically-deciding-to-Y would have been even better. My worries at this point are more general, and may be answered in later sections. (The problem with this chapter effectively being central to the whole book is that, like chapter one, it brings up larger issues). Firstly, I'm not entirely sure what gives democracy its epistemic value - since David rejects the Condorcet Jury Theorem, I'm guessing it has something to do with deliberation and exchange of viewpoints. Secondly, I'm not sure why we should refrain from over-ruling the procedure when we think it is clearly and/or very wrong. What is supposed to be the mindset of the out-voted? Is it 'I still belive I'm right, but may be wrong' or 'I still beleive I'm right, but this outcome is now legitimate'? And would David have anything to say about civil disobedience, etc? (Which Rawls seems to see as offering epistemic advantages by highlighting serious injustices) Some good questions there. I’ve been trying to push a general worry that the good consequences involved need not be decision outcomes but could be something else, like citizen education. (And David has answered, though I think we may have to disagree). I also think it’s fair to say we can’t simply identify ideal outcomes independently of how they come about. Democratically-deciding-to-X may be better than doing Y, even though democratically-deciding-to-Y would have been even better.

My worries at this point are more general, and may be answered in later sections. (The problem with this chapter effectively being central to the whole book is that, like chapter one, it brings up larger issues). Firstly, I’m not entirely sure what gives democracy its epistemic value - since David rejects the Condorcet Jury Theorem, I’m guessing it has something to do with deliberation and exchange of viewpoints.

Secondly, I’m not sure why we should refrain from over-ruling the procedure when we think it is clearly and/or very wrong. What is supposed to be the mindset of the out-voted? Is it ‘I still belive I’m right, but may be wrong’ or ‘I still beleive I’m right, but this outcome is now legitimate’? And would David have anything to say about civil disobedience, etc? (Which Rawls seems to see as offering epistemic advantages by highlighting serious injustices)

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