<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!-- generator="wordpress/2.3.1" -->
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Fairness, Democracy and Lotteries</title>
	<link>http://publicreason.net/2008/06/03/fairness-democracy-and-lotteries/</link>
	<description>a blog for political philosophers</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 18:49:23 +0000</pubDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.3.1</generator>
		<item>
		<title>By: Ben Saunders</title>
		<link>http://publicreason.net/2008/06/03/fairness-democracy-and-lotteries/#comment-764</link>
		<dc:creator>Ben Saunders</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Aug 2008 10:27:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://publicreason.net/2008/06/03/fairness-democracy-and-lotteries/#comment-764</guid>
		<description>Thanks for the comment Annabelle and apologies for the length of time taken to reply.

It is true that the lottery is not a deliberative procedure, but it operates only at the voting stage - in place of a simple majority vote, which itself is no more deliberative. The lottery is still quite consistent with deliberation taking place beforehand - indeed, I would say it may well produce more incentives for deliberation: it is always worth trying to win more support to your side, even if you have no hope of winning a majority (or already have one).

I know of Peter Stone's work and am looking forward to meeting him next month at the Workshops in Political Theory in Manchester.

Thanks again for your comment and taking the time to read my paper. Ben</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for the comment Annabelle and apologies for the length of time taken to reply.</p>
<p>It is true that the lottery is not a deliberative procedure, but it operates only at the voting stage - in place of a simple majority vote, which itself is no more deliberative. The lottery is still quite consistent with deliberation taking place beforehand - indeed, I would say it may well produce more incentives for deliberation: it is always worth trying to win more support to your side, even if you have no hope of winning a majority (or already have one).</p>
<p>I know of Peter Stone&#8217;s work and am looking forward to meeting him next month at the Workshops in Political Theory in Manchester.</p>
<p>Thanks again for your comment and taking the time to read my paper. Ben</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Annabelle Lever</title>
		<link>http://publicreason.net/2008/06/03/fairness-democracy-and-lotteries/#comment-738</link>
		<dc:creator>Annabelle Lever</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Jul 2008 12:14:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://publicreason.net/2008/06/03/fairness-democracy-and-lotteries/#comment-738</guid>
		<description>This sounds very interesting, and I think that democratic government is too often identified with majority rule, when it is only one decision procedure amongst many that democracies can use to make decisions - alternatives include appointments/personal choice (in certain circumstances) and, as you say, lotteries.  Peter Stone, at Stanford University is very interested in the topic.  But it's not a deliberative procedure, and seems suitable only where the fairness of the outcome has nothing to do with the consideration of the merits of different views.  Reasonable pluralism scarcely means we should be indifferent to logic, preference, alternative interpretations of value/desirable ends.  So while lotteries (weighted or not) seem really useful in some circumstances, they are unlikely to be generalisable across democratic decisions.  Still, thanks so much for alerting me to your piece, which sounds really interesting. Annabelle</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This sounds very interesting, and I think that democratic government is too often identified with majority rule, when it is only one decision procedure amongst many that democracies can use to make decisions - alternatives include appointments/personal choice (in certain circumstances) and, as you say, lotteries.  Peter Stone, at Stanford University is very interested in the topic.  But it&#8217;s not a deliberative procedure, and seems suitable only where the fairness of the outcome has nothing to do with the consideration of the merits of different views.  Reasonable pluralism scarcely means we should be indifferent to logic, preference, alternative interpretations of value/desirable ends.  So while lotteries (weighted or not) seem really useful in some circumstances, they are unlikely to be generalisable across democratic decisions.  Still, thanks so much for alerting me to your piece, which sounds really interesting. Annabelle</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
