‹ Final CFP: Évaluations morales des technologies controversées dans les conférences citoyennes •
Hi everyone,I’m currently writing a book called The Ethics of Voting, and thought I’d ask you for advice and comments about what you’d like to see and what you think is important. The book will cover the personals ethics of voting (questions concerning how individuals should behave) but not, for the most part, the political philosophy of voting (e.g., questions concerning who has the right to vote or how best to structure government institutions).
So, the basic questions of voting ethics that I plan to respond to are 1) Do I have an obligation to vote? 2) If I do vote, do I have obligations to vote in particular ways? 3) Is it acceptable to buy, trade, or sell my vote (not my right to vote, but my how I will vote)? Related questions concern the source of any obligations, epistemic or other justificatory requirements, issues concerning whether citizens should be directed toward the common good or some other end, and so on.
As I’m envisioning it now, the chapters will roughly go something like this. The introduction explains why voting is morally important. Chapter 1 articulates various arguments in favor of a duty to vote and shows why they fail. However, it also produces three arguments that seem pretty plausible and don’t look like they fail. Chapter 2 articulates a theory of civic virtue and of citizens duties which refutes these remaining three arguments. So the conclusion is that citizens don’t have an obligation to vote. Chapter 3 discusses cases where citizens should refrain from voting rather than vote. My view is that citizens have duties regulating how they vote if they do vote, but not a duty to vote. In particular, a necessary but not sufficient condition for good voting is that citizens must be justified in the beliefs they base their votes upon. Chapter 4 considers a wide range of objections and issues having to do with deference, autonomy, and abstention. For instance, it considers issues about whether abstention involves a loss of autonomy, or whether one should always defer to known epistemic and moral superiors. Chapter 5 argues that citizens have an obligation to vote for the common good rather than narrow self-interest, at least under normal circumstances. It also gives a liberal account of the common good. Chapter 6 argues that there is no special ethics of vote buying, trading, or selling. Instead, what determines whether these things are right and wrong is specified by the obligations we have not to vote badly and to vote for the common good when we do vote. So long as we don’t violate these rules, we don’t do anything wrong by buying, trading, or selling votes, though doing so may not be admirable. (For what it’s worth, I haven’t written chapter 6 yet, so I might change my mind about these conclusions once I sit down to defend them at length.) Chapter 7 will discuss relevant social scientific research to ask, in light of this research and my theory, how good are actual voters. Finally, I might have a chapter 8, which will go over some issues of policy, such as compulsory voting. I’ve written drafts of the introduction and chapters 1-4 at this point.So, that’s roughly what I expect to do.
My question for you, if you’re interested in helping me shape the project, is what do you think I should cover? What are some important issues or questions? Obviously I didn’t specify everything that will go in the book (e.g., I will cover tactical/strategic voting), so if I didn’t list it, it doesn’t mean I haven’t thought of it. However, there’s no doubt that there’s at least one obvious thing that I’ve overlooked. If you were writing the book, what would you talk about? How would you organize it? So, I’m open to any and all suggestions.
Thanks! -J
PS. For what it’s worth, I’m already spending a few pages in the current draft responding to an objection from Aaron Maltais that he posted here in response to my “Polluting the Polls” post. So, I really do find your suggestions helpful.
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4 comments
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1 - Tuesday, 24 March 2009 at 6:52 am
Aaron Maltais
Great to hear that my comments came to some use and I am looking forward to the book.
I guess one classic and problematic question not on your list is the issue of who should get to vote and why. Although this is not your focus it may be the case that answers to why someone has a right to vote in the first place will be relevant to answering what is and is not an ethical way of exercising that right.
2 - Tuesday, 24 March 2009 at 5:44 pm
Mariah Zeisberg
I have a question about chapter 5. “Normal conditions” include exclusion and oppression. In such circumstances, for those excluded or oppressed, voting for one’s own self-interest might be entirely appropriate. Do you think the person themselves has to have a larger defensible conception of the common good for the condition to become relevant? In other words what if their vote converges on the outcome that IS in service of the larger common good, but they themselves may or may not be aware of that fact.
I guess I also wonder about this argument in a 2-party system. Usually you’re voting for one of two parties. What does it mean to “vote for the common interest” in that context? Neither party is going to be a straightforward defender of “the common interest”– both parties have lots of problems and so on– so I am wondering how fine-tuned of a judgment this can be.
In general partisanship seems like the huge lurking question here — hard to talk about voting without talking about the larger system within which voting takes place– and I would urge you not to write a theory of voting that ignores partisanship.
Sounds like a neat project!
3 - Tuesday, 24 March 2009 at 7:20 pm
Jason Brennan
Hi Mariah,
Thanks for the your questions. (Thanks to Aaron, too.) My take on it is that voting the right way isn’t good enough. You need to be adequately justified in thinking you are voting the right way. So, suppose Obama was in fact the best candidate. But suppose Zeke voted for Obama b/c Zeke believes Obama will destroy America, and Zeke would like to see America destroyed. In chapter 3, I argue that Zeke is doing something wrong. It’s not that he’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason, but that he’s doing the wrong thing by voting without adequate justification.
I’m still working out what the theory means for 2-party systems, and when it’s appropriate to vote for the lesser of two evils, etc.
4 - Monday, 6 April 2009 at 8:03 pm
Mariah Zeisberg
Hi Jason,
Freaky example! Do you think that voting for self-interest is really just as scary as voting because you want to see a nation destroyed? Is self-interest really in that category at all? Your example goes beyond “without adequate justification,” I think . . . I might reconsider the example to make sure that too much of the rhetorical appeal of the argument doesn’t rest on the emotional impact of the scary Zeke figure. It might be worth considering whether self-interest really can be incorporated within the category of “a wrong” at all. My sense is that many people have not attended deeply *enough* to their own interests. Much of progressive political mobilization is about asking people to attend to their own interests. Jane Mansbridge has some work on the role of deliberative democracy in helping people to clarify their interests, and on the value of that clarification from a deliberative point of view.
I think this is especially important when you are talking about oppressed groups who are frequently exorted to sacrifice on behalf of the common interest. The very concept of self-interest might have quite different political resonance depending on where you are situated in relationship to the larger community. For elites we largely assume the system is working in their interests and so further efforts to nakedly advance their (our) own interests look suspect . . for people for whom no such suspicion can be warranted, a theory saying “don’t vote on the basis of your interests, and if that’s the only thing you really think you know anything about, then I’m here to tell you not to vote at all” can be a quite harmful replication of alienating disempowerment. It seems like the nature/content of the interest is also relevant. I guess I’m suspicious of your suspicion of self-interest. . . . interesting book though!