At the risk of starting another discussion on libertarianism… but for the record.

Kevin asked me to post these comments which I had hoped would make it onto the Molinari web page a long time ago. They provide a short response to some replies by Jan Narveson and Roderick Long to some comments I made on a symposium at the APA last year. Whew… anyone get that?

Just in case you are confused, here is the run down. The commentary I gave focused on a collection of essays on libertarianism and anarchism edited by Tibor Machan and Roderick Long. In it, I advanced a new argument for the conclusion that libertarians should endorse some kind of welfare liberalism.

Here were the comments I made: http://praxeology.net/molinarisoc-hassoun08.htm

Several people responded. Here are Narveson’s comments: http://praxeology.net/molinarisoc-narveson08.htm

Here are Long’s: http://praxeology.net/molinarisoc-long08.htm

Here are Thomas’s: http://praxeology.net/molinarisoc-thomas08.htm

Perhaps I should also say that I post my reply to these here only because I did not succeed in getting them on the Molinari web site and there was some discussion of the relevant argument in the commentary I posted here a while ago. This was the commentary: http://publicreason.net/2008/05/23/why-libertarians-should-be-welfare-liberals/

The longer paper on which this is all based is on my web site: http://praxeology.net/molinarisoc-thomas08.htm

You can find a podcast from a presentation at the University of Washington’s recent conference on global justice with commentary by Michael Blake here: http://depts.washington.edu/uwch/projects_conferences_global0809.htm

So, finally, here is my reply (primarily to Narveson but also to the others): — In light of Professor Long’s recent invitation to reply to commentary from the APA meeting, I’ve decided to post just a few brief responses to critics here. I’m afraid I might say “see the paper” once too often but I’ll try to refrain especially as I’m still revising it to address all of the good points everyone made.

Professor Narveson makes eight points to which I’d like to respond in turn (throwing in some comments on Long along the way). I’ll turn to Professor Thomas’s comments at the end.

Narveson’s starts with a critique of my supposition that some libertarians accept actual consent theory. Narveson questions this supposition, in part, by suggesting that we only need “individual’s actually accepting… a bunch of premises which, taken all together, imply that this person thinks the state is legitimate.” And he says libertarians shouldn’t consent to non-minimal states. This, I guess, strikes me as pretty unlibertarian. Why can’t I consent to being coerced if I want to consent? Don’t I have to understand what I’m consenting to for you to hold me to a contract? At least insofar as one is concerned about individual freedom, I don’t think see how one saying “yes, I consent to your rules” deliriously (say) could make it O.K. for a state to coerce them. His other point in this section about immoral preferences is well taken, though it does not affect the success of my main argument.

Narveson’s next point is that it is implausible to think “a person might be relevantly non-autonomous even though nobody in fact coerces them.” But I don’t think this is implausible at all. For the purposes of the paper I have only assumed autonomy requires some minimal reasoning and planning ability. Only the delirious etc. count as non-autonomous on this definition.

Furthermore, I think most people would agree that you must be autonomous (i.e. not delirious etc.) for your consent to count. It is not legitimate for me to hold you to your word if you deliriously, say, agree to sell your car to me. So why should your consent to a state count if it is not autonomous?

I am careful, however, not to say that all of the poor lack autonomy. And my argument just shows that states must help people who are so malnourished or sick etc. that they lose their autonomy (because, say, they become delirious). (This is why Long’s point about the needy not being able to contract does not go through, only the non-autonomous can’t autonomously consent to be coerced).

Finally, Narveson rejects the claim that “To be legitimate, states must do what they can to enable their subjects to secure sufficient autonomy” because this might require coercion. But even if it does require coercion, my argument is supposed to show that it is a logical consequence of the libertarian position that they have to accept this proposition. Of course that might raise another problem for the libertarian. But I don’t try to answer the question of what to do if enabling people to secure autonomy requires coercion. (I should also say that I think the idea that states must do whatever they can to enable their subjects to secure sufficient autonomy is a crazy even setting aside the worry about coercion. But I think its craziness is a consequence of the libertarian starting point… maybe one should say “so much for libertarianism”?)

(On an aside: Narveson says libertarians do not accept the claim that “sometimes, the best that a state can be is imperfectly legitimate. Sometimes a state’s being imperfectly legitimate is better than the alternative.” For he says the alternative is being perfectly legitimate. But, the first part of the quote is intended to indicate that that is not the alternative).

Narveson’s fourth point is that “it is a fallacy to go from: [i] states are legitimate only if they are autonomously consented to, to [ii] we may therefore be compelled to bring it about that certain human organisms not currently autonomous but capable of becoming so are so, in the interests of legitimizing the state. As she herself says, ‘In order for someone to actually autonomously consent to a state that person must be able to do so.’ Well - and if she is not able to do so? Then she doesn’t participate in the poll, and that’s that.”

Narveson explains his claim by saying that people, once autonomous, might consent to coercion “hardly justifies us in bringing them to that condition.”But the problem for libertarianism is that (by hypothesis i.e. the nature of states and enabling) states will continue to coerce (illegitimately) unless they enable these people to secure sufficient autonomy. Nothing here rides on autonomy being a good thing.

So I’m not so sure what else to say. I assume that states can’t coerce even the non-autonomous without their consent. If Narveson agrees to that then I think the conclusion that states must enable these people to consent will follow. (I should also say in response to Long that the second premise of my argument was only meant to block the claim that it is acceptable to coerce the non-autonomous without consent, and as long as libertarians do not accept this I’m not particularly attached to that premise. See the paper and its footnotes for more details.)

But, if Narveson thinks states can coerce the non-autonomous without their consent, I think his commitment to freedom is not as strong as mine. And, the argument still applies to those who are currently autonomous but haven’t consented and will lose their autonomy without state support.

(Note: I think that if states were doughnuts, and the non-autonomous were allowed to live in the holes - free from income taxes and every other sort of state-sanctioned coercion -, my argument would only apply to the doughnut. I think the argument can be made to apply to any entity exercising coercive force over a territory. If the non-autonomous are not coerced then I think we can think of them as excluded from the territory. If the territory contains only autonomous people, then the obligation will only be to ensure that if these people temporarily lose autonomy and could regain it (quicker or only) with the state’s help then, if the state doesn’t just shrink — ceding to the non-autonomous some sort of autonomous region out of the state’s territory, it must enable these people to regain their autonomy. This gets at one of Long’s first comments as well.)

Narveson’s fifth point about the formulation of Simmons’ argument seems correct but I think Simmons’ argument can easily be modified to avoid the worry. I think the important point is only that his argument shows that a non-minimal state can be legitimated by consent (contrary to minimalism). So libertarians shouldn’t be minimalists. (What I don’t see is how, if everyone consented to a protective organization providing the needy with welfare as well as protection, the result wouldn’t be a state. Why wouldn’t it be? And if it is a state, how is it minimal?)

I’m not sure I understand Narveson’s sixth point. But I want to emphasize that the crux of my argument is illustrated with the Samantha analogy. If Narveson accepts it, rejects anarchism, does not think contracts with the delirious (etc.) can be free, and thinks states can do something to help at least a few people secure sufficient autonomy, I think he’ll have to agree that they must do so. But, from his response, I think Narveson would qualify as an anarchist on my account. And the paper is not intended to address anarchists.

Seventh, Narveson rejects the claim that “if all states had such welfare systems many of the 18 million people who die every year of easily preventable poverty related causes might survive” and suggests that the free market is a better solution to world poverty. I’m not seeing any empirical data to support his claim and since my claim only requires a very minimal empirical assumption, I’ll maintain it. I need only suppose that there are at least a few people states could help with welfare who would otherwise lack autonomy (I provide such evidence in the foreign aid paper mentioned at the start). If there are such then I think libertarians’ should agree that states have to help these people. As to the larger question of whether the free market is the best way to enable people to escape poverty, I have a paper forthcoming in the Journal of Moral Philosophy that addresses some empirical arguments for this conclusion. You can find a draft here: http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/papers.php It is called “Free Trade: Poverty and Inequality.” I’d love to hear what people think.

(On a related point Long says: “Hassoun thinks the assumption that voluntary means will be insufficient is “minimal,” but in light of the extensive libertarian literature on ways in which the state systematically interferes with voluntary measures to relieve poverty, the assumption is not going to seem minimal to her target audience.” I only mean to suggest it is minimal in the logical sense, millions of people now (at time t) lack autonomy, at t+1 at least one person will still lack autonomy).

Finally, Narveson argues that “if our only duty is to refrain from violating liberty, then there is, prima facie, no reason why anybody, including states, would be obligated to help persons whose rights they have not violated.”But (re: below) it is precisely because states have a duty not to coerce that they have an obligation to do what they can to enable their subjects to secure sufficient autonomy. Again, the obligation is a remedial one, but the kind of remedial obligation most people recognize. If libertarians deny that this obligation exists they must do one of two things. 1) Explain what is wrong with the Samantha analogy (explain where the disanalogy lies) or 2) explain why we do not, even in the Samantha case, have any such remedial obligations.

Although I’ve already said a bit about Long’s comments, let me conclude with one final thought on those and some thoughts on Thomas’s comments.

First, I found Long’s idea about consent not being able to justify a state on libertarian principles (if the Rothbard-Barnett argument is correct) very interesting. I’ll need to think more about that. Second, I’m not sure where Thomas got the idea that I don’t care about the practical implications of political ideals. I do care. I mention one paper below where I consider the empirical evidence for free trade and I have other papers that consider the practical implications of political ideals. In fact, I consider what kinds of evidence are best for proving all kinds of empirical claims in some detail in one of these papers (ostensibly about foreign aid). So, rather than just gainsaying Thomas’s claims about the relevant sorts of empirical evidence, let me just raise a few questions for him below and apologize for just referring to that paper here (see: http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/papers.php). Finally, I have three questions for Thomas.

First, Thomas says: “The market anarchist can’t argue that in the political arena today, people are not free to defend their own rights. If he did, this would seem to imply that anarchic provision of law can only take place in the context of some overarching order that already rules out violations of rights, or at least rules out any form of government.” But couldn’t she say they are less free than they could be?

Second, Thomas says: “I advocate limited government because I think that the effective provision of law is necessary for rights to be protected as a social norm: that’s what I take a limited government to do, whatever its elements may need to be.”I’d like to know why he thinks that this supports a limited rather than a robust government that also provides law effectively.

Finally, he says: “In aiming toward such a society, we should work to clarify what rights are, why we need them, what they imply, how they can be institutionalized, and how they can be effectively protected. Insofar as many anarchist accounts seem to assume that some process as such will ensure rights protection, I think this is assuming the result we need to work to create. It is this assumption about process that my question today is meant to address. If what we have today politically is in fact the result of free competition in the provision of law and the use of force, then the general evidence of the effects of competition over governance lies in every political institution that has ever existed, not in some subset. We don’t need statistical tools to tease out the evidence: we just need to study political history.”

But that would seem to imply that there is no competition, no question about which is better - anarchy or a large state. Is that right?

– Finally, for anyone who is interested, a revised version of the original commentary I gave ended up as a book review. You can find that here: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15866O.K. hope that links it all together Cheers, -Nicole