March 2011

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On Gaus section 19
I should preface these remarks with the proviso that I am simply a guest blogger for this section, filling in for someone who dropped out, and have been unable to follow the earlier discussion in the online reading group. For that reason, I am not as intimately familiar with the rest of the book as most of the other participants, so I fear that my remarks will reflect my poor grasp of the overall architecture of this most intriguing, but often forbidding, book. I also apologize in advance if I raise any issues that have already been thoroughly hashed out in earlier discussion.

Overview:
As I read it, section 19 attempts to lay down one of the foundation stones for GG’s larger effort to reconcile two apparently opposed ways of thinking about the authority of moral rules:

(1) the ‘instrumentalist’ (Hobbesian, Humean, Gauthierian) view that ‘social morality is necessary for human cooperation and social life’ and
(2) the ‘deontological’ (Rousseau, Kant, Strawson, Rawls, Darwall) view that moral requirements are irreducibly constituted by relations among agents who recognize their mutual standing as free and equal persons.

Earlier in the book, GG has said that ‘both are correct’ (193): social morality is both a ‘device’ of social coordination and a body of rules deriving its authority from its consistency with respect for the freedom and equality of all agents. In this section, GG starts to explain how they are integrated and, moreover, why both are necessary. According to GG, taking (1) more seriously than contemporary Kantians often do is the key to overcoming the threat of ‘indeterminacy’ that hangs over the public reason idea.

The ‘indeterminacy’ involved arises because there are, in principle, many alternative sets of moral rules that are consistent with the ‘rights of agency’ and the ‘abstract’ idea of ‘jurisdictional rights’ GG has defended in earlier chapters. Even if these general entitlements can be publicly justified, agents must still settle on a scheme of rules that all can regard as having requisite moral authority. Without such a settlement, it will be impossible to reach agreement on how exactly the more general entitlements of ‘free and equal’ persons should be interpreted in particular cases. Each of these more specific schemes of moral expectations is publicly justified, yet so far no one has sufficient reason to accept any of them as uniquely publicly justified.

One is tempted to suggest here that a uniquely publicly justified scheme can be identified only if it is selected by a collective decision rule that is itself publicly justified. The main point of this section is to deny that this ‘Procedural Justification Requirement’ (392) is necessary. This is good news, according to GG, because he appears to believe that that requirement is impossible to satisfy without resorting to highly artificial – and hence reasonably rejectable – redescriptions of the choice situation (as with Rawls’s Original Position).

In the body of the section, GG attempts to explain how it is possible for a uniquely justified set of social/moral rules to emerge automatically through interaction between agents who are at all times acting only on reasons that reflect their own commitments. To establish the possibility of such a solution, GG relies on a series of game-theoretic coordination models. These are intended to illustrate how the bare, even random, fact of convergence (within iterated interaction) on one of a pair of alternative moral schemes can be (1) an equilibrium solution and (2) in large N-person cases generate a bandwagon effect. As a result of iterated interaction, players in these games find themselves in situations in which they acquire sufficient reason to accept schemes of rules just because others have already opted for them; as more and more do so, we reach a point at which everyone has sufficient reason to go along with the option around which convergence is occurring.

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Via Jason Swadley at Brown, a new online political philosophy quarterly: The Art of Theory. This issue contains an interview with Michael Sandel, pieces by John McCormick and Sharon Krause, and a roundtable discussion of Ryan Patrick Hanley’s Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue.

The petition can be found here and I urge readers to consider signing it. It makes a point of principle, not politics: that the UK-based Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) — which funds research in areas such as law and philosophy — should remove mention of “The Big Society” in its details of strategic research funding priorities. “The Big Society” was a campaign slogan of the Conservative Party. The principled objection is that the policial campaign slogans of any party should not be included. This would be true if the then AHRB had included “The Third Way” after the 1997 election which saw Tony Blair become Prime Minister. This is not about which political party you prefer, but a statement of principle.

I have been delighted to see such strong support across political and disciplinary divides for this proposal. Let us hope the AHRC takes notice and removes this language from its funding documentation.

As part of a project to assess the relative impact of different works of political theory I ran a google scholar citation search on the authors listed below.  Works had to be at least 10 years old, and with a minimum of 100 citations.  I’ve listed them in order of citations/year.

Arendt, Rawls and Habermas are special cases and I’ve listed their top two cited works.  Google lists Arendt’s and Habermas’ works multiple times so I suspect they are undercounts. Obviously works with appeal outside of political theory and philosophy get a good deal more traction.

The list is simply based on people who came to mind as I was doing this.  I stopped when I realized how much time I was spending, so  this is hardly complete.  If you have additions and wish to contact me (or post) I’d be grateful. (rehfeld [@] wustl.edu)

Special cases (see note above):

John Rawls (see note above):

  • A Theory of Justice, 33,386 total citations, 856/yr   
  • Political Liberalism, 7974, 443/yr

Hannah Arendt (see note above)   

  • The Human Condition (1958): 7595, 143/yr   
  • The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951):  4584, 74/yr

Jurgen Habermas (see note above)   

  • Structural Transformation (1991/1962):  3743, 187/yr   
  • The Theory of Communicative Action (1984):  4933, 133/yr

The list in order of citations per year (total citations, citations per year)

  1. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990): 5841 total citations, 278/yr
  2. Martha C Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2001): 2440, 244/yr.
  3. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (1961): 7733, 155/yr
  4. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982): 4330, 150/yr
  5. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract: (1988): 3261, 142/yr
  6. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (1996): 2052, 137/yr
  7. Susan Okin, Justice Gender and the Family: 1868, 85/yr
  8. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (1983): 2327, 83/yr
  9. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999): 959, 80/yr
  10. Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the State (1981): 2260, 75/yr
  11. Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (1992): 1542, 75/yr
  12. Hanna Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation: 3255, 74/yr
  13. Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1994): 1168, 69/yr
  14. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (1995): 1062, 66/yr
  15. Mark Warren, Democracy and Association (2001): 507, 51/yr
  16. Robert Dahl’s Preface to Democratic Theory (1956): 2538, 47/yr
  17. James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, (1993): 795, 44/yr
  18. William Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (1993): 783, 44/yr
  19. Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (1993): 1067, 38/yr
  20. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (1953): 1695, 25/yr
  21. Jacob Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear, (2000): 193, 18/yr
  22. Brian Barry, Political Argument (1965 and 1990 reissue combined): 797, 17/yr
  23. Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals, (2000): 190, 17/yr
  24. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (1991): 323, 16/yr

13-14 April 2011, Milan, Faculty of Political Science, Via Conservatorio 7

Program

April 13th , 2011

9.00: Welcome Address

Marco Maraffi (Department of Social and Political Studies)
Maurizio Ferrera (Graduate School in Social Economic and Political Sciences)

9.30: Justice, Truth, Transitions

Chair: Antonella Besussi (University of Milan)

Transitional Justice and Constitution-Making Processes
Andrea Lollini (University of Bologna)

Transitional Justice as Liberal Narrative
Ruti Teitel (New York Law School)

Discussants: Claudio Corradetti (University of Rome “Tor Vergata”); Chantal Meloni (University of Milan)

15.00: Another kind of Justice?

Chair: Alessandra Facchi (University of Milan)

Drawing the Line. Amnesty Truth Commissions and Collective Denial
Frank Haldemann (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights)

When Transitional Justice Becomes Restorative
Sandrine Lefranc (Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique ISP/CNRS Université Paris Ouest)

Discussants: Enrico Biale (University of Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli); Beatrice Magni (Univeristy of Milan);
Valeria Ottonelli (University of Genoa)

April 14th, 2011

9.30: Memory, Forgiveness and the Unforgivable

Chair: Franca D’Agostini (Politecnico of Turin – University of Milan)

The (Im)possibility of Political Forgiveness
Paige Digeser (University of California, Santa Barbara)

Justice, Peace, Truth. German and Italian war crimes and Allied Justice in Italy: 1945-1948
Michele Battini (University of Pisa)

Discussants: Francesca Pasquali (University of Milan); Mario Ricciardi (University of Milan); Gabriella Silvestrini (University of Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria)

All detailed information at www.graduateschool.unimi.it/truth_justice_2011.html

At the end of Chapter 17 we saw that the argument from abstraction cannot provide the determinate moral rules that are needed for social coordination.  Members of the public are left with a set of optimal eligible interpretations of the abstract rights presented in Chapter 17.  In Chapter 18 we see how that set can be further narrowed.

Gaus begins with a discussion of the function of rights and an attack on the common taxonomy of choice vs. interest theories of rights.  Rather than give a theory of the necessary conditions of something being a right, Gaus is concerned with what he calls the jurisdictional function of rights.  Gaus’ concern with rights is practical; he is concerned with what rights do, not with giving a theory that specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions of rights.

In so many places in OPR, we have seen Gaus put aside the traditional metaphysical and epistemological concerns with reasons, morality, and responsibility to focus on the practical problems that arise from an attempt to make sense of individual reason and social morality.  The distinctiveness of Baier-Strawson view (which should really be just called the Gaus view) is primarily this focus on the essentially practical nature of the philosophical enterprise.

Gaus sees rights as a solution to the practical problem of the incommensurability of values.  How is it possible to find a collective choice or social agreement between persons when their fundamental values so often conflict?  In the last section we saw that one solution may be to abstract or idealize to find out what common standards we share, but as we have seen, this solution only has limited usefulness.  Another solution is to “partition the moral space” (372) so that each individual is the rightful decision maker in his or her own defined sphere.  In effect, why not privatize social morality in a publicly justified way so that not all value questions are open to social choice?  In each individual’s sphere, they are sovereign and others may not  override their decisions.

The contrast to what might be called the devolution of moral authority is what Gaus calls the centralizing response.  The centralizing response hold that when faced with evaluative diversity, the proper response is look to commonalities in values to try to regulate and organize social morality with an overarching standard.  The problem with this solution to the problem of diversity is that, as we saw in the last section, it is indeterminate.  In contrast, by devolving moral authority each individual has a determinate authority over a determinate sphere.  This solves the problem of seeking a common standard for the basis of public moral authority by relocating that authority in the rules of devolution rather than in the substantive claims of public moral authority itself.

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This workshop examines various aspects related to the ethics and politics of procreation. Although we often think of procreation as an essentially natural act, in reality states commonly engage in procreation politics” directly affecting children, their parents, and third-party non-parents. For instance, states in numerous ways institute rules and regulations that govern when or how children are brought in the world . Similarly states adopt polices that redistribute the costs and benefits associated with procreating and parenting children. This raises numerous foundational and practical concerns.

Foundational questions we would like to examine in this workshop include:
- Is there a moral right to procreate and, if so, what sort of right?
- What are legitimate reasons for the state to interfere in procreation?
- Who bears the primary responsibility for children?
- What duties follow from the act of procreating a child?
- How does taking into account our obligations towards future generations or the global community alter procreation decisions by private individuals or the state?

We also plan to discuss questions closer to family policy, including:
- Is licensing procreation acceptable?
- How should we regulate access to reproductive assistance?
- What are the limits of state interference with the family? Who should pay for children?
- Does the number of children in a family matter in terms of procreation and parenting rights?
- Should children be allowed to participate more directly in society, including perhaps vote?

These questions are meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, and we are happy to consider any papers that fit our broad theme.

To apply, please send a proposal with a brief title and abstract to Anca Gheaus (anca.gheaus@gmail.com) or Jurgen De Wispelaere
(jurgen.dewispelaere@gmail.com) by the 31st of May 2011.

For more info on the Manchester Workshops, please visit the website
at: http://manceptworkshops.wordpress.com/

Call for Papers for the MANCEPT Workshop

Methods of Interpretation and the Politics of Hermeneutics

31st August- 2nd September 2011, University of Manchester

Political theorists have responded somewhat ambiguously to the ‘interpretive turn’ that shaped the humanities and social sciences in the mid to late twentieth century. After an initial phase of turning attention to questions of interpretive method in the 1960s and 70s, which led to fierce methodological disputes over contributions from Cambridge historians, they subsequently turned away from such questions in the 1980s and 90s, based on the assumption that all practitioners implicitly agree on how they interpret texts. With the twenty-first century, the vocation has entered a third phase in which there is an increasing recognition that hermeneutic methods have yet to be adequately addressed.

Given that political theorists have almost always imported insights from history and philosophy, there is a need in the discipline for contributions that seek to assess existing approaches to interpretation in terms of their advantages and costs for the study of politics. In particular, there has been no enquiry into the question of whether these approaches are ideologically sustained (whereby ‘ideologies’ are understood as systems of political thinking through which agents interpret the world that surrounds them (cf. Freeden 1996)), and if so, whether ideologically charged approaches in turn induce political theorists to systematically ignore some aspects of texts, whilst emphasizing others?

This workshop invites papers that aim to answer these and related questions with regard to modern accounts of hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricœur), ‘textual’ (Strauss et al.) and contextual approaches (Skinner for the ‘Cambridge School’, Koselleck and Richter for Begriffsgeschichte), Marxian readings (Althusser, Macpherson et al.), as well as deconstructive (Derrida et al.) and feminist interpretations (Okins, Pateman et al.). The workshop thus aspires to shed light on the politics of interpretive methods and to offer a space for innovative thinking about the tools that scholars use in analyzing texts.

Abstracts of up to 500 words are requested by Friday 20th May 2011. Please submit abstracts, along with your CV to jens.olesen@stcatz.ox.ac.uk. For more information on the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory, see http://manceptworkshops.wordpress.com/.

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The Ethics of Voting

Hi everyone,

I’m pleased to announce my book The Ethics of Voting (Princeton University Press) is now published. You can read the introduction here.

(I get about $3.00 in royalties if you buy it, so here are links to Amazon, which has sold out its initial batch, and Barnes and Noble.)

The main positions I defend in the book are:

1. There’s generally no duty to vote.

2. People can exercise exemplary civic virtue and pay whatever debts they have to society (if there are such things) without participating in politics. Political participation (and knowledge) is nothing special when it comes to civic virtue.

3. If people do vote, they have strong obligations to vote for what they justifiedly believe will serve the right ends of government, or otherwise they must abstain. This holds true even though individual votes are inconsequential. (I expanded and revised my argument from”Polluting the Polls”, as, for example, I realized that it didn’t cover cases of people voting for the right things for the wrong reasons, and it didn’t handle bad fringe voting very well.)

4. It’s okay to buy, trade, or sell votes, provided you don’t violate #3.

5. If social scientific work on voter behavior is correct, then most voters probably qualify as bad voters per my theory.

I’m going to be on CBC radio (I think on Sunday Edition) this weekend discussing some of these topics in light of the likely elections in Canada.

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Summary of OPR.VI.17

Chapter VI begins by reminding us of an important conclusion from the previous chapter, namely, that the Members of the Public (MoP) will be confronted with a large set of rules of social morality, and that with respect to these rules, the MoP (as a group) is indifferent (they prefer any member of the set to no rule at all, but do not converge on any particular member of that set).

The goal of this chapter is to advance to two partial solutions to this ‘problem of indeterminacy.’  They both concern individual rights, specifically, those rights commonly known (from Benjamin Constant’s famous essay) as the ‘liberty of the moderns.’  These solutions are only ‘partial’ because they serve only to narrow somewhat the set of eligible rules of social morality, but do not pick out any particular rules.

Section 17 presents the first of these two partial solutions.  In this section, drawing on the work of Benn, Gewirth, and Rawls, Gaus employs an ‘argument from abstraction’ to show that all reasonable Members of the Public would be committed to endorsing, at least in an abstract form, certain fundamental individual rights (the ‘liberty of the moderns’), as such rights are essential for effective agency.

Gaus begins the section by reminding us of the ‘Kantian-Rawlsian two-step procedure’ for arriving at justified principles under circumstances of reasonable pluralism (diversity of ends and values among the reasonable MoP). Roughly, this procedure involves ‘bracketing’ our disagreements, adopting a shared perspective, and reasoning on the basis of this shared perspective (the perspective of pure practical reason for Kant, the perspective of the original position for Rawls).

Gaus advances his own ‘argument from abstraction’ in this section in order to show that the MoP would support certain individual rights for all persons.  However, specific interpretations of individual rights, that is, specific rules, acceptable to all MoP in accordance with the ‘deliberative model,’ will need to be formulated at a later stage.  Nonetheless, showing that all reasonable MoP endorse such rights can serve to narrow the set of eligible rules of social morality (rules that deny such rights to some persons or deny them altogether are ruled out).

Gaus claims that the success of any argument from abstraction (whether Rawls’s original position argument, or the argument that Gaus advances in this section) depends on three claims:(a) the successful identification of a shared perspective (the original position for Rawls; the perspective of abstract agency for Gaus); (b) the importance or weightiness of the evaluative standards identified by the shared perspective (why the conclusions of the shared perspective should be taken seriously by the MoP for the purposes of evaluating rules of social morality); and (c) the ability of the conclusions generated via the shared perspective to survive the return of the Members of the Public to their ‘full set of evaluative standards’ (i.e., the ability of the conclusions of ‘pro tanto justification’ to survive ‘full justification’).

Gaus asserts that it was a concern with (c), the compatibility of the conclusions of the shared perspective (the conception of ‘justice as fairness’ endorsed by the parties in the original position) with reasonable persons’ various ‘comprehensive doctrines,’ that prompted Rawls’s move to political liberalism.  Rawls’s commitment to the original position device as the appropriate perspective for ascertaining principles of political justice remains constant from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism (p. 336).  As we’ll see, Gaus thinks that while the first principle of justice as fairness (the basic liberties principle), or some version of it, survives (c), the difference principle cannot.

The “second abstraction characteristic of Rawls’s original position,” Gaus explains, is that it focuses on the justification of abstract principles rather than rules.  Gaus restates his claim (from 14.3) that “principles are too vague and too subjective to interpretive controversy to provide an effective framework for cooperation” (p. 337).  Nonetheless, identifying principles shared by the MoP can be useful, since such stably shared principles would at least eliminate many proposed rules for social morality.

Read the rest of this entry »

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Keele University is considering closing its philosophy department. Anyone concerned should join this facebook group for more details on how they can help fight it. 

Alumni and others concerned by this are encouraged to write emails to this address: savekeelephilosophy@groups.facebook.com

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After specifying formal constraints on proposals (V.15), this section focuses on how to evaluate them, especially under conditions of indeterminacy. As with the previous section, I provide a summary of the major arguments and then raise some preliminary questions. I should note that, in various places, I have tried to simplify technical aspects of Gaus’s discussion.

Summary

This section begins with the problem of how to rank qualified proposals offered by Members of the Public (MoPs) in the Deliberative Model. One option would be to consider all proposals simultaneously, but Gaus rejects this possibility as unrealistic given our cognitive limitations. He argues instead for pairwise comparisons of proposals to construct ordinal rankings that satisfy modest conditions of social choice, including “asymmetry of preferences, symmetry of indifference, reflexivity of preference, and transitivity of strict preference” (305). Read the rest of this entry »

The Political Thought Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom will be holding a one-day conference on “Democracy and its Critics: Ancient and Modern” at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford University on 22 October 2011 (tentative date and venue). Below is an outline of the aims of the conference and a call for papers. Interested participants should contact either Dr. Evangelia Sembou (evangelia.sembou@hotmail.com) or Dr. Zenon Stavrinides (z.stavrinides@leeds.ac.uk). Please send abstracts to BOTH Dr. Evangelia Sembou and Dr. Zenon Stavrinides. 
 
 (apologies for cross-posting)

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS: ANCIENT AND MODERN 

Most of the countries of the world are now democracies in that they have representative governmental institutions controlled by freely elected officials which operate under the rule of law and guarantee a wide array of individual rights, including equality and non-discrimination, personal liberty, freedom of expression, association and conscience, fair trials and a variety of social benefits. If a country’s democratic system works tolerably well, the large majority of its citizens would not want to live under a very different political system, such as an absolute monarchy, communism, fascism, one-party dictatorship or anarchism, and this provides some indication of the relationship between citizenry and democracy. Nevertheless,  in the past century or so democracies have had their critics and in some cases powerful enemies who have argued that democracy does not provide society the security, economic development, welfare and the other goods it ‘really’ needs. Some critics, for example, argue that modern liberal democracy is not a ‘real’ democracy as power is actually exercised not by the people, but by an oligarchy or a bureaucratic elite, and they compare this system unfavourably with the direct democracy of Athens and other Greek city-states in the 5th and 4th centuries BC where the body of citizens actually participated, on an equal footing, in making decisions on public issues. However, ancient democracy also had its critics, including great thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. Similar  republican forms of government in ancient Rome also had their critics and enemies.

The aim of the conference is to bring together and encourage discussion among scholars who are interested in the main features of ancient and modern forms of democracy, and seek to assess the purposes and methods of their governments by reference to the wishes and needs of the people. 

Papers are invited that deal with any of the above issues. Please send an abstract to BOTH Evangelia Sembou (evangelia.sembou@hotmail.com) and Zenon Stavrinides (z.stavrinides@leeds.ac.uk) by 30 April 2011. 

 Motivation and Global Justice Workshop

22-23 June 2011

University of York

On 22-23 June, the Political Philosophy group at the University of York will host a workshop on ‘Motivation and Global Justice’.

The aim of the workshop is to consider the persistent gap between the demands generated by our best theoretical accounts of global justice and the action in support of global justice that real world agents are motivated to take; and to advance normative research on global justice that is sensitive to, and informed by, empirical questions.

Confirmed speakers:

Carol Gould (CUNY) ‘Does Global Justice Presuppose Global Solidarity?’

Katrin Flikschuh (LSE) ‘Domesticating Global Justice: An African Perspective’

Graham Long (Newcastle) ‘Justifications for Sentimental Manipulation’

Lea Ypi (Oxford) ‘Activist Political Theory and Avant-Garde Agency’

Simon Hope (Stirling) ‘The Cosmopolitanism of Fear’

Kerri Woods (York) ‘Moral Motivation and Distant Others’

Sue Mendus (York) Title tbc

The workshop will close with a roundtable discussion, with participation from Paul Gready, director of the Centre for Applied Human Rights at the University of York.

Interested parties are warmly invited to attend, but as places are limited, please register in advance by contacting Kerri Woods
(kerri.woods@york.ac.uk). A registration fee of £25/£15 will be payable to cover catering costs. The workshop will begin at lunchtime on 22nd June, and close at approximately 6.15pm on the 23rd.
Acknowledgements: Support from the Society for Applied Philosophy, the C and JB Morrell Trust, and the British Academy, is gratefully acknowledged.

(Apologies for cross-posting.)

This post provides a summary of Section V.15 and then raises some preliminary questions.

Summary

In the last section (V.14), Gaus advanced the Basic Principle of Public Justification and developed a Deliberative Model for determining whether social morality satisfies that principle. Andrew Lister summarized the parameters of the model here. Most of section V.15 is devoted to specifying the model further by constraining the set of rules that may qualify as proposals within it.

Before discussing particular contraints, however, Gaus describes the Deliberative Model as reflecting the Kantian idea of “legislation in the realm of ends” (292). Every person represented in the model is both subject to the law and the legislator of it. But, as Gaus notes, this is a fairly sophisticated idea. What if normal moral agents (NMAs) can’t understand or appreciate it? We can’t expect most people to grasp the complex philosophical arguments offered for reasoning from within the Deliberative Model. As Gaus says, not everyone is a stage 6 Kohlbergian reasoner. The question, then, is how to develop the Deliberative Model so that justifications for proposed rules of social morality (or “proposals”) are accessible to all NMAs. The answer is that the model itself need not be accessible to all NMAs; only the reasons offered for proposals must be accessible (and acceptable) to them. You don’t have to be able to read (or understand) the Order of Public Reason to have sufficient reasons for endorsing rules of social morality, but you do have to be able to understand the reasons that justify those rules.

Having addressed this concern about the accessibility of the Deliberative Model, Gaus next specifies and defends a number of formal constraints that qualify proposals as moral rules, rather than rules of some other kind. These constraints are as follows: Read the rest of this entry »

The Groupe de recherche en philosophie politique de Montréal (GRIPP) is pleased to announce a one-day workshop dedicated to the 2011 winner of the Annual Montreal Political Theory Manuscript Workshop Award, “Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism,” by James Ingram of McMaster University. The workshop will be held at McGill University on May 13, 2011.

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The 2011 meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy will be on the topic of “Federalism and Subsidiarity” and will be held during this year’s APSA, September 1-4, in Seattle.  Our conference, to be held on a single day (TBA), is being organized by NOMOS editor James Fleming (Law, BU) and Jacob Levy, (Political Science, McGill), who will serve as co-editor for the subsequent NOMOS volume.  Principal papers will be given by:

  • Sotirios A. Barber (Political Science, University of Notre Dame);
  • Steven Calabresi (Law, Northwestern University); and
  • Daniel Weinstock (Philosophy, University of Montreal).

Commentators include:

  • Ernest Young (Law, Duke University);
  • Jenna Bednar (Political Science, University of Michigan);
  • Andreas Follesdal (Philosophy, University of Oslo);
  • Judith Resnik (Law, Yale University); and
  • Loren King (Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University).

Program schedule with paper titles and up to date information will be found in the coming weeks on our website:  www.political-theory.org.  I invite members of Public Reason to join the ASPLP as well.  Members determine each year’s conference theme and receive a copy of the NOMOS volume that emerges from the conference held in the year they were members.  More information on joining can be found at our website, or e-mail me at theasplp [@] gmail.com.   —Andrew Rehfeld, Secretary-Treasurer, ASPLP.

Reconstructing RawlsHi folks,

Just wanted to make a shameless plug for my new book, which may be of interest to some of you. Here’s a link to the book’s PSUP website (which has further links to Amazon, etc.) and a synopsis.

With the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, John Rawls not only rejuvenated contemporary political philosophy but also defended a Kantian form of Enlightenment liberalism called “justice as fairness.”  Enlightenment liberalism stresses the development and exercise of our capacity for autonomy, while Reformation liberalism emphasizes diversity and the toleration that encourages it. These two strands of liberalism are often mutually supporting, but they conflict in a surprising number of cases, whether over the accommodation of group difference, the design of civic education, or the promotion of liberal values internationally.  During the 1980′s, however, Rawls began to jettison key Kantian characteristics of his theory, a process culminating in the 1993 release of Political Liberalism and completing the transformation of justice as fairness into a Reformation liberalism.

Reconstructing Rawls argues that this transformation was a tragic mistake because it jeopardized the most important features of his theory, viz. the lexical priorities of right, liberty, and fair equality of opportunity as well as the difference principle.  Controversially, this book contends that Rawls’s so-called “political turn,” motivated by a newfound interest in diversity and the accommodation of difference, has been unhealthy for autonomy-based liberalism and has pushed liberalism more broadly towards cultural relativism, be it in the guise of liberal multiculturalism or critiques of cosmopolitan distributive-justice theories. The book then demonstrates that the central elements of justice as fairness can only be defended within the context of a Kantian Enlightenment liberalism and that Rawls’s hope for a more pluralistic grounding for his theory, endorsed by a wide variety of belief systems present in modern democratic societies, is illusory.

Reconstructing Rawls is the first book to compare Rawls’s and Kant’s theories systematically and the first to offer an internal critique and reconstruction of justice as fairness, reconceiving it as a comprehensive, universalistic Kantian liberalism. By doing so, it gives us both the vision of a liberal world order–”a republicanism of all states, together and separately,” as Kant put it–and a mode of justification addressed to all men and women, not as members of particular nations, races, and faiths, but as human beings, as citizens of the world. In short, it reclaims Rawls for the Enlightenment.

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I summarized Section 14 in a separate post; here I want to raise a question about the reactive attitudes and authority claims that Gaus argues are essential parts of our ordinary moral practices. For the purposes of this post, I want to accept Gaus’s claim that recognition of sincere and conscientious disagreement has to undermine feelings of resentment and indignation at rule-violations. The question I want to ask is why in identifying the rules of social morality we must assent only to those rules that all members of the partly idealized public have sufficient reason to accept.

A rule that fails to meet this standard will be one that will not support the normal reactive attitudes with respect to all normal moral agents. But so what? Why is it crucial that all normal moral agents be subject to resentment and indignation for rule violations, to the point that it would be preferable not to have a rule at all, than to have a rule that (in virtue of being reasonably rejectable) would fail to license reactive attitudes with respect to even just one normal moral agent? Gaus’s answer, I think, is that our moral practices include not only reactive attitudes such as resentment and indignation, but prescriptions that claim to be authoritative. We express resentment and indignation as a prelude to issuing imperatives. But if someone doesn’t have sufficient reasons to endorse a rule, it would be wrong for us to order them to comply with it, which means that the rule would effectively not apply to them. But then we would not have a common set of rules of social morality; instead, we would have a parcellized set of rules covering the various overlapping bits of conflicting evaluative perspectives. Morality would not fulfill its function.

If this is the argument, I have two doubts. The first is that I’m still not clear that moral practices involve claims to authority, in the specific sense of authority of one person over another, authority to command compliance in face of disagreement, e.g. “Even though you don’t think you should ?, you should still ? simply because I am ordering you to ?.” Moral practice clearly involves expression of reactive attitudes and claims that others should respect the authority of morality, but these claims may simply be epistemic claims about what is right, rather than claims that others should defer to our judgment about what is right.

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I summarized Section 14 in a previous post; here I raise some critical points about the question of whether public justifiability should include a shared reasons requirement, and how this relates to sincerity in public deliberation.

Gaus rejects the requirement that deliberators deliberate in terms of shared reasons. To be a bona fide moral rule, a rule must be endorsed by each and every member of the appropriately (i.e. partly) idealized public, each based on the total set of reasons he or she accepts. “Mutual intelligibility” requires only that these personal evaluative standards pass some threshold of plausibility such that they can be generally recognized as genuine moral perspectives. But members of the public will still think that many of the reasons their fellows appeal to are bad reasons. They also think that this use of bad reasons for the assessment of moral rules is appropriate. In intellectual argument each will criticize the other for accepting bad reasons, and argue that others ought to change their views. When it comes to determining what count as valid moral rules, however, everyone accepts that each will assess proposed rules based on his or her own evaluative standards, and that rules will count as valid only if they meet with the unanimous approval from these diverse perspectives.

An alternate view would be that deliberators accept that they are to deliberate only on the basis of the reasons they share. What is wrong with the shared reasons view? Gaus’s answer in Section 14.4 (d) comes in the form of a response to Jon Quong’s argument for the shared reasons view.1 Quong’s argument is based on the requirement that public reasoning be sincere. I will explain the dispute, then briefly argue that the underlying issue isn’t really about sincerity.

Insincere deliberation may be justified in some circumstances, but it is pro tanto morally bad because it makes public reasoning into a form of manipulation. If I argue that your beliefs commit you to supporting a particular proposal even when I don’t think they do, then I am not respecting your capacity for rational moral agency; I am treating you as a thing to be moved, not a person to be reasoned with. Conversely, sincerity in public reasoning expresses respect, helping to sustain civic friendship. Quong formulates the idea of sincerity in public justification in terms of three conditions, involving persons A(lf) and B(etty) and a proposal X.

  1. A reasonably believes he is justified in endorsing X,
  2. A reasonably believes that B is justified in endorsing X (…)
  3. A may only… offer arguments in favour of X to B that he reasonably believes B would be justified in accepting.2

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  1. Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, OUP 2010, Chapter 9 “The Scope and Structure of Public Reason” []
  2. Gaus cites the first two of these conditions on 288. All my quotes from Quong are from Chapter 9 of from Liberalism Without Perfection []

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This post provides an overview of Section 14 and explains the relationship of this section with previous sections; I make some critical comments in separate posts linked below. I hope I haven’t gone overboard, in terms of the total length of the posts, but section 14 is important because it lays the groundwork for Jerry’s conception of public justification. At the same time, it is the conclusion of the previous 100 or so pages of argument about the moral emotions. So I want to summarize the main claims of section 14, but also explain how they follow from earlier sections. And of course I have some questions and criticisms.

Overview

Section 14 defines the “Basic Principle of Public Justification” (BPPJ) and lays out “the deliberative model” that specifies the principle. The BPPJ provides a necessary condition for a moral imperative to be authoritative. The assumption is that an imperative “?” is made in a particular context C based on a rule L. The condition is (1) that each normal moral agent has sufficient reasons to internalize L and hold that L requires ? in circumstances C, and (2) that moral agents do generally conform to L.

The BPPJ provides a rule-based standard for assessing particular moral demands in context, and so has as one of its components a criterion for determining when a rule counts as a bona fide moral rule; each and every normal moral agent must have sufficient reasons to internalize the rule. The idea of a normal moral agent (NMA) has figured in Gaus’s earlier discussions of moral psychology. A person is a moral agent if they have the capacity to understand and care about following social rules for its own sake; such an agent is normal if they have the cognitive capacities of a fully-functioning but still boundedly-rational human being. Thus some people do not qualify as NMAs, either due to lack of cognitive capacity (young children, severe mental disabilities) or lack of ability to internalize rules (young children, psychopaths). The reasons an NMA “has” are not the reasons there truly are, nor simply the reasons that agent thinks she has. On the one hand, Gaus argues that there is no point in saying that I “have” a reason if it is completely inaccessible to me, given my epistemic situation. On the other hand, he accepts that I have a reason not to cross the bridge in front of me even if I don’t think I have such a reason, if a reasonable amount of investigation and reflection would reveal the bridge to be unsafe (234-6). The reasons a NMA has are thus the reasons she would have if she engaged in a respectable amount of good reasoning based on what she currently believes (summarizing 250).1

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  1. For doubts about the idea that we have reasons that we would recognize if we deliberated more, see Alexander Moon’s comment to the previous installment of the discussion group []

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Hello Public Reasoners,Simon has graciously given me permission to use my posting privileges here to tell you about a new group blog that I’ve started, along with Jason Brennan, Andrew J. Cohen, Jacob Levy, Daniel Shapiro, and James S. Taylor.  It’s called “Bleeding Heart Libertarians.”  It is, in the words I used in our inaugural post, a blog that is meant to serve as a “forum for academic philosophers who are attracted both to libertarianism and to ideals of social or distributive justice.”  If that’s of interest to you, you might want to check it out.

Hi folks -Christian Coons at BGSU asked me to post this conference announcement.  Should be a good conference, so come on by if you can make it to BGSU! Here’s the announcment

Hello,

If you have final-year undergraduates who are thinking of pursuing graduate studies in political philosophy, they might be interested to know that the University of Sheffield’s MA in Political Theory is accepting applications for funded studentships until March 31. This one-year MA is offered jointly by Sheffield’s Departments of Politics and Philosophy, both ranked highly (equal 1st and 4th respectively) among UK departments in the most recent national Research Assessment Exercise. Our MA students have done very well in applications to PhD programmes in both the UK and North America. More information is available here: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/politicaltheory/ If you could draw this opportunity to the attention of suitable students, I would be most grateful.

As we saw on Monday, Gaus believes that the externalist view of having a reason carries with it serious problems.  Furthermore, the attempt to decrease the diversity of reasons that one has through idealization is beset by the twin problems of indeterminacy and path-dependence. Even with radical idealization of our cognitive faculties, we would still not necessarily, or even likely, end up sharing all of our reasons.  This leads Gaus to give up on the idea of full rationality as a possibility.

Once we give up on the idea of full rationality, we are led, Gaus argues, to theorize from the point of view of what John Pollock called real rationality.  Pollock distinguishes, helpfully, between justified and warranted choices.  Justified choices are the products of epistemically valid procedures of reasoning; warranted choices are the product of all possible relevant reasoning.  Gaus argues “in a world of less than perfect information and cognitive capacities, we need some concept to indicate when a person’s reasoning about the world is up to acceptable standards and when it is not.” (247)

This conception of justification cannot be equated with truth, however.  The fact that there is a reason does not necessarily mean that anyone actual person will necessarily be justified in acting on that reason.  One can be justified in having a reason, but what ultimately matters in terms of interpersonal justification is whether or not that reason is warranted.  One can be reasonably said to have a reason, however, if they do not have any defeaters that are accessible to them.  This standard is importantly not that there are no defeaters, there may be, but they are not accessible to a person that has done a reasonable amount of reflection and investigation.  Gaus argues that “the reasons you have must be accessible to you, and as a real rational agent in a world in which cognitive activity has significant costs, rationality does not demand one keep on with the quest to discover less and less accessible reasons.”  (253)

What counts as a respectable amount of deliberation is often vague and will vary with context.  Gaus compares what counts as a respectable amount of deliberation in a physics seminar to what counts for a baseball umpire.  Baseball umpires need to make calls quickly and, hence, deliberation must be very quick, understanding that there will be a certain amount of error.  Not so in a physics seminar.

Morality, after all, is not meant to be the esoteric doctrine of the epistemic elite.  We expect normal adults to be able to grasp and follow the rules of social morality.  Gaus claims that “normal moral agents have accessible undefeated reasons to affirm” the rules of social morality. (255) The idea that normal adults should be able to recognize their moral reasons sets a maximum limit on the epistemic demands of normal moral reasoning. But, we must be careful not to set the bar too low.  People do wrong and we often think it is because they did not take sufficient care or deliberation before they acted.  The thing to do is not always glaringly obvious.  After all, our conceptions of social morality are not static, we genuinely learn both from our own actions and from what others tell us.  The possibility of moral change, both progressive and regressive, occurs because finding out what reasons we have is often a social and collaborative venture.

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