Articles by Andrew Lister

In the previous chapter, David showed that procedural fairness could not by itself justify democracy. According to “fair proceduralism”, a law that is the outcome of a democratic vote is legitimate because everyone had an equal role in determining the outcome, regardless of whether it is good or just by other standards. Yet since a coin flip also provides equal input, fair proceduralism must incorporate some substantive value, such as the principle that outcomes should be positively sensitive to voter preferences.

Chapter 5 confronts a possible response to this argument, a response based on a partial concession. Yes, we have to appeal to substantive values to justify democracy, but we can do so with respect to the intrinsic characteristics of decision-procedures, without making any claims about their tendency to yield good decisions or (incidentally) to generate other desirable outcomes. We thus avoid any substantive assessment of political decisions / outcomes (except for endorsing the preservation of democracy, which is an outcome, but the outcome that consists in the continued functioning of our intrinsically-valued procedure). David calls this position “intrinsic democratic proceduralism” (86). The chapter criticizes 3 versions of this doctrine: Habermas, Cohen, and Waldron. Read the rest of this entry »

Does anyone one know if Rousseau had read Hume’s essay “Of Original Contract”? I’m teaching Hume this year in my second year history of political thought course, in between Locke and Rousseau. Hume showed that political legitimacy and obligation cannot be based on actual consent - the poor unilingual peasant has no real exit option. Remnants of an actual consent theory persist in Rousseau’s Social Contract, as in the footnote to 4.2, which says that residency implies consent and hence legitimacy of institutions only in a free state, where people have the right to leave. Yet Rousseau also advances the new view that the idea of free agreement between equals can help us design legitimate institutions, as in 1.6 of the Social Contract, where the idea of a social contract is clearly not legitimating whatever is agreed to, but rather helping us figure out what we should agree to, in order to preserve our freedom. If Rousseau had read Hume’s essay, it seems he would have distinguished these two types of consent and these two roles consent can play more clearly. I’m hoping someone can help me out with the biography / history (though also with the interpretation, if I’m missing something). For a clear misreading of this history, and its relation to Rawls, see here and compare to pp.336-7 of A Theory of Justice, in particular note 2, where Rawls says that he does not accept the whole of Hume’s argument, but believes that it is correct as applied to the political duty for citizens. (What part did Rawls not accept?)