Articles by Jonathan Quong

In this chapter Sen presents a distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ impartiality. He argues that closed impartiality suffers from a number of significant limitations which ought to lead us to favour open impartiality. In this post I will briefly summarize the main claims Sen makes (sect. 1), before offering a few of my own comments (sects. 2-3).

1.
Sen offers Adam Smith’s device of the impartial spectator as an exemplar of what he calls open impartiality. Smith encourages us to imagine our conduct as we think it would be seen by some impartial and fair observer. A fair and impartial observer, Sen suggests, might require considering ‘the judgements that would be made by disinterested people from other societies’ (p. 125). Sen associates closed impartiality with Rawls’s device of the original position, where the aim is to evaluate rules and institutions from the point of view of each person who would be bound by them (suitably constrained behind the veil of ignorance). On this view of impartiality the perspective of outsiders (i.e. those not bound the rules and institutions) is not considered relevant.
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I am delighted to announce that the journal Representation has just published a symposium on David Estlund’s book, Democratic Authority. The symposium - which includes papers by Ben Saunders, Andrew Lister, myself, and a reply from David Estlund - grew out of the reading group that was initially hosted here at Public Reason in the early part of 2008.

I should also add, as an associate editor of Representation, that this symposium is part of a broader effort to encourage more political theorists and philosophers to publish in the journal. We are aiming to create a journal which publishes both empirical and theoretical work on representation and democracy, so if you work in these areas, please consider us as a venue.

The Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT) is delighted to announce a conference celebrating the career of our distinguished colleague, Professor Hillel Steiner. Professor Steiner’s pioneering work on freedom, rights, exploitation, and justice has profoundly influenced moral, political, and legal philosophy over the last forty years. This conference will bring together scholars from around the world to discuss some of the central themes from Professor Steiner’s work. Participants will include:

• Ian Carter (University of Pavia)
• Eve Garrard (University of Manchester)
• Alan Hamlin (University of Manchester)
• Matthew Kramer (University of Cambridge)
• William Lucy (University of Manchester)
• Eric Mack (Tulane University)
• David Miller (University of Oxford)
• Serena Olsaretti (University of Cambridge)
• Michael Otsuka (University College London)
• Jonathan Quong (University of Manchester)
• Zofia Stemplowska (University of Reading)
• Peter Vallentyne (University of Missouri)
• Philippe Van Parijs (Universite catholique de Louvain)
• Jonathan Wolff (University College London)

Registration for the conference is now open, and the booking form can be found, along with a provisional conference schedule at:http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/events/justice/

Lectureship in Politics (Political Theory) School of Social Sciences Politics
Closing date: 07/07/2009
Reference: HUM/90779

Applications are invited for the above continuing lectureship in Politics, specializing in Political Theory, tenable from 1 September 2009. The successful candidate will join the Politics discipline area and be attached to the Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT).We are looking for demonstrable evidence or potential evidence of research excellence in Politics. Applicants must have, or be about to complete, a relevant PhD and have research and teaching interests in the core areas of contemporary analytic political theory including theories of justice (including global justice), equality, rights and responsibility. Applicants must have experience of providing high quality teaching at undergraduate and/or postgraduate level and will teach undergraduate and postgraduate modules in Political Theory, supervise dissertations and make appropriate teaching contributions across Politics, as required.

Salary£32,458 - £35,469 p.a. (Grade 6) / £36,533 - £44,931 p.a. (Grade 7)

Informal enquiries
Name: Professor Alan Hamlin, Head of MANCEPT
Tel: + 44 (0) 161 275 4906
Email: alan.hamlin@manchester.ac.uk

OR
Name: Professor Inderjeet Parmar
Tel: + 44 (0) 161 275 3056
Email: inderjeet.parmar@manchester.ac.uk

Further details: http://www.manchester.ac.uk/aboutus/jobs/academic/vacancy/index.htm?ref=158532

• Date: 20-21 November, 2009
• Location: University of Manchester

The Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT) is delighted to announce a conference celebrating the career of our distinguished colleague, Professor Hillel Steiner.  Professor Steiner’s pioneering work on freedom, rights, exploitation, and justice has profoundly influenced moral, political, and legal philosophy over the last forty years. This conference will bring together scholars from around the world to discuss some of the central themes from Professor Steiner’s work. Participants will include:

• Ian Carter (University of Pavia)
• G.A. Cohen (University of Oxford & University College London) (provisional)
• Eve Garrard (University of Keele & University of Manchester)
• Alan Hamlin (University of Manchester)
• Matthew Kramer (University of Cambridge)
• William Lucy (University of Manchester)
• Eric Mack (Tulane University)
• David Miller (University of Oxford)
• Serena Olsaretti (University of Cambridge)
• Michael Otsuka (University College London)
• Jonathan Quong (University of Manchester)
• Zofia Stemplowska (University of Manchester)
• Peter Vallentyne (University of Missouri)
• Philippe Van Parijs (Universite catholique de Louvain)

Further details regarding registration and accomodation will be forthcoming later this spring. For more details regarding MANCEPT please visit us at:www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/researchgroups/mancept/ 

This is just a reminder that the registration deadline for the Society for Applied Philosophy’s annual conference in Manchester (July 4-6, 2008) is June 13.  We have a terrific line-up of speakers, and I hope to see many of you there!

Summary
In this chapter, David wants to distinguish his epistemic argument for democracy from what he calls the democracy/contractualism analogy (I’m going to refer to this simply as the analogy or the analogy argument). The analogy rests on two key claims. The first is that justice or moral rightness is best understood via some version of moral or political contractualism. The second claim is that democratic outcomes have the capacity to track the requirements of justice or morality because democratic institutions can be arranged in a manner that is sufficiently similar the structure of the hypothetical choice situation of whatever theory of contractualism is favoured. David rejects the analogy because he believes this latter claim is false. If democracy does track justice (something David obviously doesn’t want to deny) it is not because democratic institutions mimic the features of a hypothetical contract scenario.

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In order to ensure that there is sufficient time to discuss chapter 11, we’re going to delay the other scheduled posts for the reading group by one week. The revised schedule is as follows:

Chapter 12 ‘The Irrelevance of the Jury Theorem’

Apr. 7, 2008, Loren King

Chapter 13 ‘Rejecting the Democracy/Contractualism Analogy’

Apr. 14, 2008, Jonathan Quong

Chapter 14 ‘Utopophobia: Concession and Aspiration in Democratic Theory’

Apr. 21, 2008, Zofia Stemplowska

‘Author’s Comments’

Apr. 28, 2008, David Estlund

Hi everyone, and welcome to the second week of our Estlund reading group where we’ll be discussing chapter 2, ‘Truth and Despotism’.

Summary

The chapter begins with a worry, expressed by Arendt, that appeals to truth in politics can be despotic. Saying something is true seems to foreclose any further debate or disagreement. Truth appears to be a conclusion we reach at the end of discussion or reasoning, and so if we base our politics around claims of truth, it looks as if we are saying no further discussion or reasoning is necessary - the answers have already been determined. But shouldn’t politics fundamentally be about discussion and debate? Arendt claimed that at least philosophical truths (as opposed to factual truths) have no place in politics because they will despotically foreclose dispute. I’m going to call this the despotism objection to truth in politics (my term not Estlund’s). There is, however, a very different sort of worry about truth in politics. On this view, the problem with appeals to truth in politics is not that they preclude disagreement or debate, but rather that they engender too much disagreement, or disagreement that is too fractious and divisive. It’s this kind of worry that might explain some political liberals’ belief that we ought abstain from appeals to truth in politics.

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Welcome to the first instalment of our virtual reading group on David Estlund’s Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Today’s post will focus on chapter 1, which offers a synopsis of the book’s central arguments and conclusions.

Summary

Estlund begins by noting the apparent tension between democracy and political quality. The masses seem ill-suited to making the best political decisions, and thus many democratic theorists see their primary task to be one of explaining why democracy is valuable or desirable despite the risk it poses to making good decisions. Estlund takes a different approach. He claims that it is in fact democracy’s tendency to produce good decisions that explains democracy’s legitimacy and authority. Legitimacy, according to Estlund, refers to the moral permissibility of the state issuing and enforcing commands due to the process by which they were produced, whereas authority refers to the power of one agent to morally require or forbid actions by others through commands (p. 2). Estlund’s central thesis is that ‘democratically produced laws are legitimate and authoritative because they are produced by a procedure with a tendency to make correct decisions’ (p. 8).

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This is just a friendly reminder that our virtual reading group on David Estlund’s Democratic Authority will be starting on January 14 with a discussion of chapter 1. Hope to see lots of you there!

I’m very happy to announce that, starting in January, we’ll be having a virtual reading group on David Estlund’s new book, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. We’ll read one chapter a week, and each week someone will post a brief summary of the chapter, as well as provide a few questions or comments to help kick-start the discussion. Those who want to participate can then use the comments function to discuss the chapter. I hope that lots of people, not just the initial list of contributors below, will decide to join in. We have a great group of contributors, and David has also very kindly agreed to participate in the discussion and provide his own post at the end. Below is a schedule for the reading group, which lists each chapter as well as the person who will start the discussion that week. See you in January! Read the rest of this entry »