Articles by Robert Talisse

A quick interruption to let PRers know that my book Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge University Press)  has just come out. Here are few endorsements from the back cover:

‘Talisse sees profound moral and religious conflict in our political life that threatens democracy, and makes impossible effective defenses by appeal to shared values. He advances an important alternative: our common commitment to sound beliefs should lead us all to endorse democratic politics. This is a fine work of public philosophy in the tradition of J. S. Mill and John Dewey.’ –Gerald Gaus, University of Arizona

‘Robert Talisse has provided us with a timely, original, and unapologetic defense of constitutional democracy. It is, he says, the only form of government suited to persons who are already committed in their everyday lives to giving reasons for their beliefs. Artfully blending careful philosophical analysis with contemporary illustrations and accessible prose, Democracy and Moral Conflict makes an authentically democratic and powerfully reasoned case for democracy.’ –John C. P. Goldberg, Harvard University

‘Robert Talisse argues that democracy comes closer than any other political system to instantiating the norms of the folk epistemology which all citizens share. Insofar as we care about the truth, we have a reason to remain committed to democracy, even when the stakes are highest. An engaging read, this book makes an important contribution to the growing discussion of democracy’s epistemic virtues.‘ –David A. Reidy, University of Tennessee

PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

Public Affairs Quarterly is planning a special issue on “Science and Public Affairs.” We seek submissions on any topic addressing questions of the role of science and technology in public and social policy. Of special interest are papers addressing questions of genetic enhancement, science education, the role of scientific evidence in the law, and the social responsibilities of scientists.

Please send an electronic copy of the paper to Robert Talisse at robert.talisse@vanderbilt.edu, and a hardcopy to Robert Talisse, Editor PAQ, Philosophy Department, 111 Furman Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240.

Just a quick distraction from the excellent discussion of David’s book. A short pop piece that I wrote with my friend Yvonne Raley titled “Getting Duped” is about to appear in Scientific American Mind. “Getting Duped” identifies a new fallacy, a twist on the Straw Man, called The Weak Man, in which one picks one’s weakest opponent, soundly refutes him or her, and then claims that the weak opponent is representative of the strength of all opposition to one’s view. The claim is made that much of the polarized discourse in popular political commentary employs this fallacy (viz., refute Ward Churchill, then claim to have refuted Noam Chomsky). Anyway, I thought it might of of interest. Here’s a link to the piece: “Getting Duped.”

It should be mentioned that “Getting Duped” draws on a paper I co-authored with Scott Aikin that appeared in Argumentation titled “Two Forms of the Straw Man”.

Comments, criticisms, thoughts, refutations, etc. are of course welcome.

Just a quick note to Public Reasoners: I’ve taken up the editorship of Public Affairs Quarterly. I’m still getting my bearings, and submissions info on the journal webpage needs updating, etc., but I hope you will keep PAQ in mind for your work.

Happy New Year to all,

–Bob

I’ve been working on Berlin-style value pluralism lately. I’m particularly concerned with the attempt (made by Galston and Crowder, among others) to derive liberal political commitments from value pluralism. My sense is that value pluralism has no entailments regarding politics. But that’s a topic for another day. I’m writing here to try to get some help on the meaning of a comment by Bernard Williams frequently cited approvingly in the value pluralist literature.

In his introduction to Berlin’s *Concepts and Categories*, Williams claims that “if there are many and competing values, then the greater the extent to which a society tends to be single-valued, the more genuine values it neglects or suppresses. More, to this extent, must mean better.”

Maybe I’m just being thick-headed about this, but I don’t see how “more must mean better,” unless some common measure among values is presupposed; but value pluralists must deny that this kind of common measure exists (the lack of common measure in part explains the incommensurability among values and the unavailability of rational rank-orderings among them). So it seems to me that Williams’ “better” must not mean *morally* better. But if that’s the case, then I don’t see how Williams’ point is of much use to the value pluralist.

Am I missing a natural reading of Williams’ comment that’s both consistent with value pluralism and of use for making the case that value pluralism entails liberalism?