Category Archives: Reading Group

I, too, join the praise for Corey’s work and appreciate the invitation to participate in this forum. Writing an original, well-executed and compelling book, such as this one, on a topic that has been debated for so long and by … Continue reading →

I want to begin by thanking Corey for the opportunity to read his wonderful book. I found it well-written, original, and thought-provoking, and I am sympathetic to many aspects of his approach. While I sometimes disagreed, I always struggled to … Continue reading →

Along with the other commenters, I’m grateful for the opportunity to take part in this reading group. I find Corey’s book both timely and provocative; perhaps one of the book’s main virtues is the way in which it frames controversial … Continue reading →

I have learned a great deal from Corey’s book and the blog posts so far; I appreciate the opportunity to kick off our discussion of Chapter 4.  Because of the Thanksgiving holiday in the US I’ve written up this post … Continue reading →

The main challenge of chapter 3 is to explain and defend the view that while the state is permitted (indeed required) to engage in democratic persuasion aimed at producing reflective revision (i.e., talk people out of certain illiberal views) it … Continue reading →

This section is very interesting, though it might be less exciting than the others in this chapter. It focuses on the question of state provision of public goods and addressing negative externalities. The last section takes up forms of “practical … Continue reading →

I apologize for my tardiness. I have fallen behind in my readings, but I was also ill this week and am only today rising (from bed). I expect there will be a number of corrections to be made in what … Continue reading →

Overview of §21 The Deliberative Model, as is now familiar, is indifferent between the various rules in the socially optimal eligible set as possible bases of equilibrium.  It doesn’t select one of the rules as the favoured basis of an … Continue reading →

Overview of §20 In §20, Gaus explores the idea—foreshadowed in §19—that not only can a selection from the socially optimal eligible set of rules be justified as a result of convergence in a ‘Kantian Coordination Game’ (see §19.2), so that … Continue reading →

On Gaus section 19 I should preface these remarks with the proviso that I am simply a guest blogger for this section, filling in for someone who dropped out, and have been unable to follow the earlier discussion in the … Continue reading →

After specifying formal constraints on proposals (V.15), this section focuses on how to evaluate them, especially under conditions of indeterminacy. As with the previous section, I provide a summary of the major arguments and then raise some preliminary questions. I … Continue reading →

Chapter 9 concluded with the requirement that an adequate account of social rules must be able explain how rule-based reasons can generally override, and yet be somehow responsive to, the other kinds of normative reasons we consider in our deliberations.  … Continue reading →

Human beings are social and rule-following creatures.  Gaus has been arguing that our status as rule-followers is central to explaining our social character – that the development of cheater detection and punishment was necessary for the evolution of complex social … Continue reading →

Summary We saw in section 2.5 that Gaus gives his refutations of attempts to derive principles of morality with revisionist accounts of rational choice in interactive contexts (again, game theoretic contexts). In section 2.6 Gaus considers what he takes to … Continue reading →

Summary Sections 2.5 and 2.6 form the core argument of this chapter. These sections can be studied independently of each other, but I think it worthwhile to first take a look at how they work together to support Gaus’ main … Continue reading →

Summary Gaus begins this section by describing a Kantian proposal for how to reconcile the freedom and equality of persons with the authority of morality. First, we bracket our private ends-those things that divide us. Second, we focus on those … Continue reading →

OPR attempts to show how moral authority can is possible despite disagreement among free and equal persons about the nature of morality. To do so, we must determine what moral authority is and the challenges it raises. Section 2 might … Continue reading →

Section 1 has a simple aim: to introduce Gaus’s distinctive concept of “social morality” and to describe its central features. Social morality is “the basic framework for a cooperative and mutually beneficial social life” and “provides rules that we are … Continue reading →