We are extending the deadline for submitting abstracts for BGSU’s conference on the scope of religious exemptions until December 1st, 2014.
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
The Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics and Public Policy
The Scope of Religious Exemptions
April 17th-18th, 2015
The Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics and Public Policy will take place in Bowling Green, Ohio, April 17th-18th, 2015. The keynote speakers are Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame) and Andrew Koppelman (Northwestern University).
Those interested in presenting a paper are invited to submit a 2-3 page abstract (double-spaced) by December 1st, 2014. We welcome submissions in all areas in applied ethics and philosophical issues relevant to this year’s conference theme: the scope of religious exemptions. We are especially focused on papers that address normative questions about religious exemptions, including the moral-philosophical justifications for religious exemptions and how often and to whom religious exemptions should be granted. We will consider multiple approaches to the topic, not merely in political philosophy and political theory, but normative ethics, metaethics and applied ethics.
Let me begin by thanking Blain for an excellent recap of Chapter 4 of the book, which is arguably the centerpiece chapter. He raises five important concerns, but I’m going to set two aside. First, Blain raises the question of my Rawls exegesis. I suspect that is something better dealt with in a journal format or conference proceeding. It is interesting and important, but my main arguments do not depend on it. I will say, briefly, that yes, the process of generating convergence justifications can encourage revision of pieces of certain comprehensive doctrines. The second issue I set aside concerns my indirect model of public justification and the idea that restraint (of a certain sort) applies to legislators but not to citizens. That is one of the two main questions at issue in Chapter 6, so I’d like to push discussion to that post. But briefly, a lot of the case for the indirect model is based on the fact that citizens complying with restraint is neither necessary nor sufficient to promote publicly justified outcomes given all the other stages between a popular vote and the passage of legislation.
Summary of chapter 4
The goal of chapters 3 and 4 is to explain that the “Public Justification Principle” (PJP) does not entail the ‘principle of restraint.’ This involves showing that there is no necessary relation between the PJP and an ‘accessibility’ or ‘shareability’ requirement on justificatory reasons. Chapter 3 identifies two desiderata for evaluating different conceptions of justificatory reasons: (1) respect for personal integrity, and (2) respect for the fact of reasonable pluralism. Chapter 4 argues that the convergence account of public reason, which does not include the principle of restraint, fulfills these desiderata more successfully than rival consensus accounts.
Call for Applications
Perspectives from Law, History and Political Theory
University of Edinburgh / 24 to 26 June 2015
In June 2015 the University of Edinburgh will offer an interdisciplinary Summer School on Political Violence. This three-day event will give participants the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge of an unrivalled panel of international experts in the field of war and political violence and to receive critical feedback on their own projects. The programme combines people and perspectives from History, Law and Political Science and will involve intensive scholarly discussions and social activities that allow participants to network with each other in a friendly environment in the scenic, culturally vibrant setting of the city of Edinburgh. Participants will include a diverse mix of academics, MA and PhD students from the Social Sciences and Humanities, and practitioners working in NGOs and legal institutions.
Thanks to Andrew Lister for an admirably concise and rich review of the third chapter of my book. The main aim of Chapter 3 is to lay down the strategy for vindicating the convergence view. I argue that respect for integrity and reasonable pluralism are both foundational values in public reason liberalism, so foundational that they can be used to choose between conceptions or interpretation of the idea of public reason. I will argue that the convergence view is superior on both grounds to the mainstream consensus view in Chapter 4.
But Lister raises some important concerns about how that vindication is going to go.
Chapter 2 set out the argument linking public justifiability with restraint, advanced the integrity and fairness objections to restraint, and criticized the stability argument for restraint. Later chapters will attempt to uncouple public justifiability from restraint by arguing for what I think of as an indirect convergence view. Continue reading