distributive justice

You are currently browsing articles tagged distributive justice.

The expensive tastes objection constitutes a familiar argument against egalitarian (and other) theories of distributive justice that require redistribution of resources from those whose aims are relatively cheap to pursue to those whose aims are relatively expensive to pursue just in virtue of the difference in the costs of pursuit. It’s based quite straightforwardly on the common intuition that we simply ought not to endorse such redistributions. Often, the expensive tastes objection is seen as sufficient by itself to ground the rejection of those theories of distributive justice that are vulnerable to it.

Because of this, and because—as I argue in first half of the paper attached to this post—it turns out to be crucial even to objections which don’t explicitly appeal to it, the intuition in question (call it ‘the expensive tastes intuition’) is hugely important in debates about the ‘currency of egalitarian justice’. Yet it’s surely somewhat troubling that so central a plank in the case against the kinds of theories that are vulnerable to the expensive tastes objection should rest on one bare intuition—and one about societal arrangements with which we’re utterly unacquainted, at that.

I think that it is. Nevertheless, I share the intuition. So, in the second half of the paper, I try to uncover a plausible basis for it. To this end, I argue that what underlies the appeal of the metrics that render a distributive theory vulnerable to the expensive tastes objection—namely ‘distributive subjectivism’, which cedes authority in the assessment of what is good for individuals to the individuals themselves—can’t ultimately perform the task for which it is intended. The task for which is it is intended is that of avoiding appeals to values not shared by all in the justification of our political arrangements: the task of attaining the liberal ideal of legitimacy. I argue, however, that claims to redistribution in putative cases of expensive taste cannot, on subjectivist metrics, ultimately be insulated from appeals to individuals’ own values. So, distributive subjectivism is unacceptable to liberals seeking legitimate principles of justice.

I end by suggesting that the argument I’ve offered can be viewed as the theoretical support for the expensive tastes intuition, enabling that intuition to bear the weight that’s placed upon it. So, the expensive tastes objection is vindicated.

The PDF of the paper, for those who don’t want to subject themselves to my peculiar accent, is here.

Zofia Stemplowska’s comments are here (Zofia’s comments are now up — SCM).

I should mention that I recorded the podcast for this symposium before I presented the paper at the Manchester Workshop in Political Theory last month. This, and no other reason, is why I haven’t incorporated into the version I post here the many helpful suggestions and revisions that were recommended to me by the participants there.

Many thanks to Zofia for her discussion and to Simon May for organising everything. Thanks also to Nat Stein for loaning me his agreeable baritone for the quotations in my podcast.

I look forward to reading all of your comments, and appreciate your making the time to offer them.

 
icon for podpress  Distributive Subjectivism, Liberal Neutrality, and the Expensive Tastes Intuition: Play Now | Play in Popup | Download

So, I’ve been thinking about utilitarianism and non-ideal theory. Although what I’ve come up with may be quite obvious, I’d be interested in reflections on the thought.

It seems to me that there are times when we might do best (even on utilitarian grounds) not to do what would maximize utility in non-ideal circumstances. Consider an instance in which this point may have practical bite. Some argue against ending child labor because the children we prohibit from working may suffer more for our good intentions. Child prostitution may be their second best option. But that this would be so, holding everything else fixed, does not mean we should not try to end child labor. What it shows is that we should try to end child labor and help educate the children we liberate. If one says that we do not have the resources to do this then we should reply that we can and need to find the resources — that is what justice requires. Even for a utilitarian, there are times when we should not do what might initially seem to maximize utility because doing that will only maximize utility conditional on facts that we can and should change. Perhaps there is reason to worry about doing non-ideal theory in some circumstances. Or, more precisely, that we have to be careful about what kind of non-ideal theory we are doing. Consider another example to support the point. Aid organizations spend a great deal of time and money figuring out how to allocate scarce resources. For instance, the WHO tries to prioritize health interventions to maximize the number of disability adjusted life years (or whatever) that it can save with its resources. But if the global distribution of medical resources is unjust and can be changed, the WHO might better spend its time trying to change the global distribution of medical resources.